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QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether an appellate court can create subject matter jurisdiction by holding a party in
contempt?
CITATION TO OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner Ohlander's appeals by way of an unpublished
memorandum decision. See Exhibit A.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court is set forth as follows:
a.

The date of entry of decision to be reviewed is July 2, 1998.

b.

There are no petitions for rehearing or extensions of time.

c.

The Utah Supreme Court has statutory jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2-2, and 3(a).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a.

The nature of the case:
This petition is from a final order of the Utah Court of Appeals dismissing Ohlander's two

appeals from a decree of divorce by the Fourth District Court of Utah, Hon. Anthony Schofield.
b.

The course of proceedings and disposition by other courts:
Ohlander (mother-resident of Sweden) and Larson (father-resident of Provo, Utah) are the

divorced parents of a daughter, Julia, who is now nearly nine years old. Julia has resided with
Ohlander in Sweden since 1992, save for a two month period in late 1993, and early 1994. The
divorce proceedings between Ohlander and Larson began in 1991 in Sweden. Ohlander was granted
custody by a Swedish domestic court, and Larson was granted rights of visitation. Larson was
unliappy with the Swedish ruling, and in November, 1993, kidnapped Julia from Sweden under the
4
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guise of exercising visitation. Ohlander came to Utah, andfileda petition in January, 1994, under
authority of the International Convention for the Recovery of Abducted Children (the "Hague"
convention), as implemented by 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994). This case was assigned to Judge
Bruce S. Jenkins, who entered an ex parte order that Larson return Julia to Ohlander. Judge Jenkins
also ordered Ohlander not to leave Utah until a hearing could be held. Ohlander instead returned to
Sweden with Julia on about February 1, 1994, and has not returned to Utah since.
Judge Jenkins eventually heard Ohlander's petition on the merits, and concluded that Utah
was the "habitual residence" of Julia. Ohlander appealed, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, in June, 1997, directing that Judge Jenkins' rulings be set aside, and the petition dismissed.
Ohlander v. Larson, 114F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. den. (1997). While Ohlander's appeal was
pending before the Tenth Circuit, Larson brought his own Hague petition before the Swedish courts.
Larson's petition resulted in December, 1995, in a final, non-appealable ruling by the Swedish
Supreme Administrative Court, that Julia was a "habitual resident" of Sweden, and that Sweden had
jurisdiction over the custody dispute.
While Hague petitions were pending, in both Utah and Sweden, Larson filed the instant
divorce action, in December, 1994, in the Fourth District Court in Utah. This divorce action was
assigned to Judge Schofield. Judge Schofield held a divorce trial, pursuant to the rulings of Judge
Jenkins, in October, 1996. A decree was entered on May 14, 1997, awarding custody of Julia to
Larson. Ohlander made a timely appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, andfiledan appeal brief on
October 9,1997. This appeal was based (in large part) upon Ohlander's objection to Judge Schofield
asserting subject matter jurisdiction over Julia's custody. After the Tenth Circuit vacated Judge
Jenkins'findingsand rulings, Ohlander made a motion under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside the
5
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divorce decree. This motion was based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Julia's
custody, in light of the subsequent disposition by the Tenth Circuit, and the Swedish Supreme Court.
The Rule 60(b) motion was denied in January, 1998, and Ohlander perfected a timely appeal.
In January, 1998, Larson argued for the first time that Ohlander should be barred from
appealing in the Utah state courts because she was in contempt of Judge Schofield's custody order.
The Utah Court of Appeals agreed, and dismissed both Ohlander's appeals on July 2, 1998. This
petition follows,
c.

Statement of Facts:
Mr. Larson met Ms. Ohlander in Sweden while serving an L.D.S. mission, in 1986. (R. 45).

Ms. Ohlander visited Mr. Larson in Utah, after his return from his mission, in 1989. (Id). The two
were married on October 27, 1989, in South Jordan, Utah. (Findings of Fact No. 1, R. 578). Mr.
Larson is a United States citizen, while Ms. Ohlander is a citizen of Sweden. (Id.) They established
their marital home in Utah County, Utah. (Id.). The parties had a child, Julia, born on August 13,
1990, in Provo, Utah. (Findings of Fact No. 4, R. 5). At the end of 1990, the parties went on
vacation with Julia to Sweden to visit the family of Ms. Ohlander for Christmas. (Findings of Fact
No. 11, R. 577). At the end of the visit, Ms. Ohlander decided to remain in Sweden with Julia, and
went into hiding with Julia. (Id.) Mr. Larson eventually returned to the United States without either
Ms. Ohlander or his daughter. (Id.)
Ms. Ohlander commenced a divorce and custody action in the Sandviken District Court in
Sweden on January 30, 1991. (Findings of Fact No. 12, R. 576; R. 46). Mr. Larson was served with
process from the Swedish court, but failed to respond. (R. 37). On May 10, 1991, the Sandviken
District Court ordered temporary custody to Ms. Ohlander, by default. (Id.; R. 391) However, over
6
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the next few months, Mr. Larson persuaded Ms. Ohlander to return to Utah. Ms. Ohlander arrived
with Julia in Utah on June 3,1991. (Findings of Fact No. 13, R. 576). The parties lived together with
Julia in Utah until January 13, 1992, when Ms. Ohlander moved to Sweden with Julia, without Mr.
Larson's consent. (Findings of Fact No. 14, R. 576).
Upon her return to Sweden, Ms. Ohlander continued the prior divorce and custody action
which had been filed in Sweden in 1991. (Findings of Fact No. 15, R. 576). Mr. Larson, who is
fluent in Swedish (Finding of Fact No. 26, R.573), appeared in the action in Sandviken, with counsel
provided by the Swedish Legal Aid Authority, and consented to afinaldivorce. (R. 40-46). He
contested custody and visitation, but on November 13, 1992, the Sandviken District Court continued
temporary custody in Ms. Ohlander, granting Mr. Larson "access" [visitation] for one month each
year. (R. 43; R. 390). Mr. Larson appealed this ruling to the Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland,
through his Swedish counsel. (R. 35-38). On January 12, 1993, the Court of Appeal ordered that
Mr. Larson's visitation be limited to four weeks, spaced throughout the year, in Sweden only, and
under Ms. Ohlander's supervision. (R. 35; R. 390).
Mr. Larson exercised this visitation, under the terms of the Court of Appeal ruling, in May,
1993. (Finding of Fact No. 20, R. 575; R. 390). The visitation in Sweden occurred during specified
daytime hours on seven consecutive days, under Ms. Ohlander's personal supervision. (Id., R. 574).
Sometime after this May, 1993, supervised visitation, Mr. Larson decided that the Swedish courts
lacked jurisdiction to decide custody of Julia. (Finding of Fact No. 21, R. 574). As a consequence,
he filed an action for divorce in Utah County in June, 1993. (Id.). Despite the fact that he had just
been in Sweden visiting Julia in the home of Ms. Ohlander, Mr. Larson obtained an order for service
by publication upon Ms. Ohlander on the basis that he did not know her whereabouts. (R. 54).
7
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Default was entered against Ms. Ohlander, and a Decree of Divorce entered on October 21, 1993.
(Id.).
On November, 1993, Mr. Larson, now remarried, went to Sweden to visit Julia. (Findings
of Fact No. 24, R. 573). This visitation was again under the supervision of Ms. Ohlander, during
specified daytime hours, and mostly in her apartment. (Id). Mr. Larson, however, was able to trick
Ms. Ohlander, and to flee Sweden with Julia. (Id.; R. 390). Julia then lived in Utah County for the
next two months with Mr. Larson. (Finding of Fact No. 25, R. 573).
On January 26, 1994, Ms. Ohlander filed a petition pursuant to the Hague Convention in the
federal district court of Utah. (Finding of Fact No. 29, R. 572).l This petition sought the return of
Julia to Sweden pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994). Judge Bruce S. Jenkins issued an ex
parte order directing any peace office in Utah to deliver custody of Julia to Ms. Ohlander, pending
a hearing. (Id., R. 571-2). This order from Judge Jenkins included a direction not to remove Julia
from Utah. In compliance with that order, Mr. Larson delivered Julia to Ms. Ohlander on January
30, 1994. (Finding of Fact No. 30, R. 571). However, on February 1, 1994, Ms. Ohlander returned
to Sweden with Julia. (Finding of Fact No. 31, R. 571).
Once back in Sweden, Ms. Ohlander refused to appear again before Judge Jenkins, and as a
result, was found in contempt on August 15, 1994. (Finding of Fact No. 32, R. 570-571). In October,
1994, Mr. Larsonfiledan application with the Swedish Central Authority for the return of Julia. (R.
645). Additionally, on December 19, 1994, Mr. Larson filed the instant divorce proceeding in Utah
County, seeking a divorce and custody of Julia. (R. 1-3). Ms. Ohlander appeared specially,

*See Ohlander v. Larson, 113 F.3d 1573 (10th Cir. 1997) for detailed discussion of the
nature and purposes of a petition under the Hague convention relating to child custody disputes.
8
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contesting the jurisdiction of the Utah County court to decide custody. (R. 14-17). On February 6,
1995, the previous Decree of Divorce obtained by Mr. Larson by default was set aside and the action
dismissed. (R. 56).
In response to Mr. Larson's Hague application in Sweden, Ms. Ohlander moved to dismiss
her own petition before Judge Jenkins. (R. 645). Additionally, on January 27, 1995, Mr. Larson filed
his own Hague petition in the Swedish courts, "for the return of Julia to the U.S.A." (R. 370). Judge
Jenkins denied Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss solely on the basis of her contempt. (R. 644).
Judge Jenkins then conducted a bench trial on the Hague issue of "habitual residency". (Id.). On
June 12, 1995, he entered a judgment declaring that Julia's "habitual residency" had always been in
Utah. (R. 248, 253). He further directed the Utah County state district court to assume and
determine custody of Julia. (R. 248, 252). Ms. Ohlander appealed to the Tenth Circuit from that
ruling by Judge Jenkins, and sought a stay of enforcement, which he denied. (Finding of Fact 45, R.
565). •On the other side of the Atlantic, on July 5, 1995, the Gavleborg County Administrative Court
denied Mr. Larson's Hague petition. (Finding of Fact No. 43, R. 565-566; R. 231). Mr. Larson
appealed to the Sundsvall Administrative Court of Appeal, which ailed in Mr. Larson's favor on
August 25, 1995. (Finding of Fact No. 43, R. 565; R. 224-231). This court of appeal ordered the
return of Julia to Mr. Larson by August 31, 1995. (Id.) However, Ms. Ohlander went into hiding,
pending her appeal to the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. (Finding of Fact No. 44, R. 565).
During the Hague proceedings in Sweden, Julia was in great fear of being removed from her mother,
relatives and school, and packed off to Utah. (Finding of Fact No. 44, R. 565; R. 408). This was
largely due to the sudden abduction Mr. Larson perpetrated the prior November. (Id.) Published
9
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accounts, which included interviews with Ms. Ohlander and Julia, graphically set forth the climate of
fear created by Mr. Larson's prior abduction. (R. 410-418; cf. Finding of Fact No. 42, R. 566). Ms.
Ohlander's appeal to the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court was granted, and that court ruled
that Julia's habitual residency, at the time of her removal to the U.S.A. in November, 1993, was in
Sweden. (R. 363-372; Finding of Fact No. 48, R. 564). This ruling was issued on December 20,
1995. (Id).
Meanwhile, pursuant to Judge Jenkins's ruling on habitual residency, Ms. Ohlander's counsel
withdrew his special appearance (R. 150), and answered the complaint for divorce and custody. (R.
181-184). This answer contained the affirmative defense that the Utah County court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the custody request. (R. 183). On September 22, 1995, Mr. Larson sought
a temporary custody order from the court in the present case. (R. 270-271).2 Mr. Larson submitted
an affidavit in support of his order to show cause alleging that Ms. Ohlander refused contact with
him. (R. 266-269). This affidavit covered his attempts to see Julia while he was in Sweden in 1995
during the Swedish Hague proceedings. (Id.) Apparently, Mr. Larson failed to seek any visitation
relief from the Swedish district court in Sandviken. (Id.) Ms. Ohlander averred that she had never
denied Mr. Larson his court-ordered visitation in Sweden. (R. 390). She further averred that she had
been the primary physical caretaker of Julia since her birth. (R. 388-390). At that time, Julia was
well-adjusted in her environment, and has a close relationship with her grandmother and other
relatives. (R. 388). Julia attended kindergarten while Ms. Ohlander attended the university in the
morning. (R. 389). In the afternoon, Ms. Ohlander personally provided care for Julia. (Id.) Julia
speaks only Swedish. (Id.) Despite having been ordered to do so by the Swedish district court in
2

Ms. Ohlander's present counsel appeared on October 12, 1995.
10
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Sandviken, Mr. Larson has never supported Juliafinanciallyat all. (R 388).
In spite of the supportive and successful environment in Sweden for Julia, on February 1,
1996, Judge Schofield issued a ruling changing temporary custody of Julia to Mr. Larson. (Finding
of Fact No. 49, R 563; R 434-438). This assertion of child custody jurisdiction by Judge Schofield
was based exclusively on Judge Jenkins' order. (R. 437). There was no analysis to support jurisdiction
under the U.C.C.J.A. (Id.). Judge Schofield based his ruling changing custody to Mr. Larson in large
part on Mr. Larson's affidavit claim that he was denied visitation, which was not ordered by the
Swedish court. Of course, this ruling was despite the affidavit of Ms. Ohlander that she provided all
court-ordered visitation. Ms. Ohlander did not comply with the change of custody order from Judge
Schofield and was held in contempt. (R. 442).
Mr. Larson sought further punishment of Ms. Ohlander, for her refusal to turn Julia over to
him. (R. 460-461). This matter was heard on May 23, 1996. Ms. Ohlander's counsel, in response,
made an oral motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem. (R. 462). Judge Schofield took the oral
motion under advisement, and continued the hearing until June 11, 1996. Ms. Ohlander's counsel
thereafter made a written request for a guardian ad litem. (R. 463-470). Judge Schofield granted
appointment of a guardian ad litem, and ordered Ms. Ohlander's counsel to recommend local counsel
to act in that capacity. (Finding of Fact No. 52, R. 562; R. 480). Pursuant to a request from Ms.
Ohlander's counsel, attorney Lori Fowlke agreed to act as guardian ad litem, and she was appointed
to act as such. (R. 482-483). At the hearing on June 11, 1996, Mr. Larson asked for telephone
visitation. (R. 479). Judge Schofield ordered that Ms. Ohlander telephone Mr. Larson each
Thursday at 10:00 a.m. M.S.T. (R 481). Pursuant to that order, Ms. Ohlander telephoned Mr.
Larson for Julia at least 13 of the 19 scheduled times before trial. (Finding of Fact No. 50, R. 553).
11
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Ms. Ohlander's counsel arranged to have the guardian ad litem's cost funded by the Swedish
government. (R. 496). The guardian traveled to Sweden, and personally visited Ms. Ohlander, Julia,
and other persons in Sweden with knowledge of Julia's circumstances. (Finding of Fact No. 52, R.
562). She prepared a detailed report to the court, submitted and received by Judge Schofield at trial.
(Defendant's Ex. 10.; R. 551).
Trial was held on October 18, 1996, over Ms. Ohlander's objection, and request to wait until
after the Tenth Circuit ruled on her appeal from Judge Jenkins' order. (R. 510-518). Ms. Ohlander
failed to appear at trial in person; however, she was represented by her counsel. (R. 552). The
guardian ad litem, Mr. Larson and his current wife were the only witnesses. (Id.). Judge Schofield,
predictably, found that the evidence favored Mr. Larson's claim for custody. (R. 550). On May 14,
1997, Judge Schofield entered "canned" Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law prepared entirely
by Mr. Larson's counsel (R. 553-579, and a Decree of Divorce (R. 580-585). This appeal followed
on June 13, 1997.
Subsequent to the decree entered by Judge Schofield, the Tenth Circuit vacated Judge
Jenkins' findings and rulings, and ordered that Ms. Ohlander's Hague petition in Utah be dismissed
without prejudice. Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. den. (1997). As a
result of the Tenth Circuit's ruling, Ms. Ohlander filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ P. 60(b),
to set aside the final judgment in this case. (R. 592-595). This motion was denied by order of
December 17, 1997, followed by a timely appeal by Ohlander. Upon motion of Larson, the Utah
Court of Appeals conditionally dismissed the appeal from the original custody ruling, and the denial
of Rule 60(b) relief on July 2, 1998. When Ohlander declined to reinstate her appeal by compliance
with the decree, the appeals were unconditionally dismissed, Exhibit A hereto.
12
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT FOR CERTIORARI
Certiorari is appropriate for the following reasons:
The Court should direct the Court of Appeals to hear and decide the question of subject
matter jurisdiction over this international custody dispute. Even though Ohlander refused to obey
Judge Schofield's custody ruling, if there was no subject matter jurisdiction, there is no contempt.
The Court of Appeals dodged prior rulings of this Court, and of its own panels, in dismissing
Ohlander's appeals without deciding the question of its jurisdiction.
Unless review is granted, and the jurisdictional standoff resolved, Utah will stand at odds with
the rulings of the United States federal courts, and the courts of Sweden. The Tenth Circuit was very
concerned about avoiding conflicting rulings from Sweden and Utah. Apparently, the Utah Court
of Appeals was not very worried about the interests of federalism or international comity.
A child's future is caught in a jurisdictional "Gordian Knot", as the Tenth Circuit put it, and
this Court is the last court that can untie that knot. While the interests of the parties, and States, and
countries are at issue, the court should recognize that ultimately it is the interest of Julia, a child not
before the court, that is at stake. It is ironic that the Tenth Circuit panel all agreed that it was an abuse
of discretion to decide this case based solely on Ohlander's contempt. The irony is only heightened
when one considers that Larson has appeared and appealed freely in the Swedish courts, despite his
non-compliance with their orders.
The court should consider the limits that may appropriately be imposed, in cases where a
child's custody is in dispute, upon the doctrines of Von Hake v. Thomas, 881 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) and D 'Aston v. D 'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), which bar a contemptuous
party's appeal. This is an issue that merits consideration for the guidance of trial courts, appellate
13
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courts, and practitioners in the domestic area. Given the ever-increasing mobility of our society, these
situations are bound to recur, and cause unnecessary cavil in the lower courts unless they are sorted
out by this Court.
The specific relief requested is two-fold: for this Court to directly hear and determine subject
matter jurisdiction or to direct the Utah Court of Appeals to hear and decide the appeal as to subject
matter jurisdiction.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
1. Contempt of Court Does Not Create Subject Matter Jurisdiction
A defect in subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even after being held in
contempt:
. . .while defects in personal jurisdiction can be waived, subject matter jurisdiction
goes to the very power of a court to entertain an action. A lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor cured by a waiver. A lack of subject
matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and when subject matter
jurisdiction does not exist, neither the parties nor the court can do anything to
fill the void.
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717,
726 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted))(emphasis added). Nothing can be done by the parties to
fill the subject matter jurisdiction void, not even by contumaciously ignoring the proceedings.
Otherwise, a trial or appellate court could create subject matter jurisdiction through the contempt
process, in direct violation of the holding of Crump.
When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its proceedings are null and void: "[sjince the
entire proceedings before the circuit court were conducted absent jurisdiction, they are a nullity and

14
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are void, [citations omitted]". Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Once the lack of subject matter jurisdiction was pointed out, the trial court had no alternative but to
dismiss. It could not proceed further, to require Ms. Ohlander to deliver custody to Mr. Larson, or
to hold her in contempt. "Upon a determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its
authority extends no further than to dismiss the action, [citation omitted]. . . . It was improper for the
court to proceed in this matter other than by dismissal. " Thompson v. Jackson, at 1232. An order
of contempt issued by a court without subject matter jurisdiction is void, and subject to attack on
appeal. Hammond v. Wall, 171 P. 148 (Utah 1917)(an order exceeding a court's jurisdiction is void,
and no contempt is committed by disobeying it); In Re Rogers' Estate, 284 P. 992, 997 (Utah
1930)("A failure to comply with a void judgment is not contempt"). See also 17 Am, Jur.2d §148,
"Contempt", p. 504-505, "A court cannot punish as contempt a violation of an order beyond the
court's power or jurisdiction".
Other courts have held that a court which lacks subject matter jurisdiction cannot hold a party
in contempt. See State v. Thomas, 550 So.2d 1067, 1070 (Ala. 1989)("in order to hold a person in
contempt, a court must have jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter"); State v. Barker,
425 P.2d 753 (Or. 1967)(order of contempt for failing to deliver custody of child void because issuing
court lacked jurisdiction over the suit); In Re Estate o/Steinfeld, 630 N.E.2d 801 (111. 1994)(unless
order is void, court with subject matter jurisdiction may enforce orders by contempt); In Re Kramer,
75 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1956)(lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by party held in
contempt).
2. This Court Must Determine If It (And The Trial Court) Had Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
The trial court had an independent obligation to determine whether it had subject matter
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

jurisdiction. This court has a similar obligation:
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to determine a
controversy and without which it cannot proceed. Without jurisdiction over the
subject matter alleged in plaintiffs claims, the court was without authority to proceed
or to enter any adjudication on the merits of the claims
The fundamental and
initial inquiry of a court is always to determine its own jurisdictional authority over
the subject matter of the claims asserted. The trial court should have examined its own
jurisdictional limitations at the time plaintiff sought the initial default judgment and
dismissed the action. . . . Even in the absence of a proper objection, the issue should
have been raised on the court's own motion. Upon its failure to raise the issue, we are
obligated to do so. [citations omitted].
Thompson v. Jackson, at 1232. An appellate coui t l"iiu,i divide a queslinn <tl Mib|o1 iiialihii
jurisdiction where it appears on the face of the record." Western Capital & Sec, Inc v Knudsen,
768 P.2d 989, WS (Utah t I A|'p 1 < W)»( quolni^ (\im\uhers v. Carreathers, <^*

s

**

Colo.

Ct. App. 1982). Accord, Transworld Systems, Inc v. Robison, 796 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The D 'Aston v. D 'Aston opinion, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), and the cases that
followed it, all rest upon the assumption that the trial coi n 11 lad ji m isdiction, to IA 1 licl i the appellant
could be forced to submit. In none of those cases was the personal jurisdiction of the trial court
questional I"1" !|iliiiii,i11' \W suh|C( I inalln

PJII'HIH IIMII

nl lln 111ill court to even enter the orders

subsequently disobeyed. For instance, the D 'Aston court held that "[appellant] must submit herself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy that court's concerns before she may exercise that
right [to appeal]." Id. at 594. Hen flu iiiuill u mil ILK! HO ,iiti|ai imitlri luiisdiclmii \\ \\ I in h JVls.
Ohlander needed to submit. To force the appellant in this case to submit to the jurisdiction of the trial
u ml wink! jsMiiir ilhc ullimnk' iii'viill nil llllit" merits, i e , subject matter jurisdiction, under the guise
of enforcing a contempt order. This is logically absurd.
The appeal brief of Ms. Ohlander points out in more detail why the trial court lacked subject

16
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matter jurisdiction. That argument is incorporated herein. Nowhere in the memorandum decision of
the Court of Appeals is there a finding of subject matter jurisdiction This Court should order the
Court of Appeals and the trial court to specifically rule on that issue, after allowing Ohlander to brief
and argue that jurisdictional issue.
3. This Court Should Exercise Its Discretion To Hear This Case, Because of the Interests Of
Third Parties, Including Sweden and Julia
The Court of Appeals assumed that D 'Aston and Von Hake applied in this case, and that
dismissing the appeal was necessary. D 'Aston and Von Hake actually do not mandate a dismissal of
an appeal in every case:
D'Aston [I] affirms the court's discretionary authority to dismiss the appeals of
contumacious litigants under terms which are fair and just given the circumstances of
a particular case. Under D'Aston [I], a court has the discretion to determine what
is a reasonable approach in dealing with a contumacious litigant who, even while
disregarding the judiciary's contempt process, nonetheless wishes to avail himself or
herself of judicial procedures thought to be beneficial.
Von Hake v. Thomas, 881 P.2d 895, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). This court should exercise that
discretion to defer consideration of contempt until it has determined whether the trial court had
subject matter jurisdiction in the first place to issue orders requiring Ms. Ohlander to deliver custody
to Mr. Larson. There are several reasons for this approach.
Most importantly, this court has an obligation to consider the effect of the opinion of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The exercise of child custody jurisdiction in this case was based
solely upon Judge Jenkins' finding of habitual residency. The Tenth Circuit set that finding aside.
There was no other basis for child custody jurisdiction. Judge Schofield elevated Judge Jenkins over
the Tenth Circuit when he refused to consider the effect of the Tenth Circuit's decision on his
exercise of child custody jurisdiction. However, the Tenth Circuit was well aware of Ms. Ohlander's
17
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contempt when it issued its opinion. Consideration of the Tenth Circuit's opinion leaves the clear
im'ssii^e thai ill iitiniiJnl oiilv nunc p i o r m l m j . ' hi defciiiiiiic child < mslodv and thai I hat p r o c e e d i n g
would be in Sweden. To suggest that the Tenth Circuit expected its opinion to be set at naught by
fin JfVitf ee court invites an accusation of contempt of the federal courts.
In a related vein, the Swedish Supreme Court has already i i ilecl that it has ji 11 isdictioi i I I lis
is a final, non-appealable ruling, binding on both parties. This court should carefully consider whether
it has subject iiiiiflii

(UNSIIH

Iinti I d o i r sctihuic, ilsd'l .il o d d * uilli lllm legal s y s t e m o f another country.

Second, it avoids the logical absurdity of assuming the ultimate result, jurisdiction, under the
guise of preserving the authority of the court. Third, it avoids determining custody by default. The
long-settled environment of Julia, the child of the parties, shoult I in I he d i s i u p l c d betauM 1 Iici

HIHIIHI

refuses to concede jurisdiction in a foreign country, in order to oppose that jurisdiction. Fourth, the
i I' iin I s h o u l d iin! i c n a i d I\ In I ai soi i s coi itempt of tl ic Swedish courts by refusing to allow Ms.
Ohlander to oppose subject matter jurisdiction in the United States.
Finally, dismissing the appeal without considering the merits would consign Julia and the
parties to a jurisdictional purgatory, where the questioi: i of I Itah's ji u isdictioi i is pe i petuall) held in
limbo. This would not be in anyone's best interests, including Mr. Larson's. Because of the unique
1 in tiinsfiiiiecs in llii'i c a w dismissal ill llir a p p e a l n n u k l Lie the w r o n g solution. Instead, t h e appeal
should be heard on its merits. If Judge Schofield is ultimately found to have jurisdiction to have
entered Ilis contempt orders, there will be time enough at that point to consider sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The sum and substance of this case is that Utah lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
child ciisictd) cast

I1* H dial ira.'vi mi ludge Schofield lacked jurisdiction to proceed, by ordering Ms.
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Ohlander to deliver Julia to Mr. Larson, and lacked jurisdiction to hold her in contempt for failing to
do so. This defect in the proceedings is so fundamental that even contempt of court cannot salvage
the situation. Further, the interests of another sovereign nation, and a little child are also at stake.
To muzzle the mother for simply honoring the legal process of her own country would be unjust to
her, her country and to Julia.
The Court of Appeals dodged the issue of subject matter jurisdiction entirely, basing its order
of dismissal solely on Ohlander's contempt and refusal to purge that contempt. This avoids the prior
doctrine of this Court, and of the Court of Appeals as well. A writ of certiorari should issue to
determine whether Utah courts have jurisdiction over this child custody dispute.
DATED this b

day of August, 1998.

' ' ""

/

/^ ^ - - ^ x <
Daniel F. Bertch
Kevin K. Robson
Attorneys for Ohlander
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APPENDIX
Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals

A

Order of Sandviken District Court (11/2/92)

u

Order ni ( m

I \ppi>jil loi Smilli Nmil mil i I ' IN''),1)

C

Swedish Supreme Administrative Court Judgment (12/20/95)

D

Fourth District Court Decree of Divorce (5/14/97)

E

Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir. 1997)
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FILED
JUL 0 2 1998
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAIt.S

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
Mark Andrew Larson,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaint iff and Appe11e e
Case No. 970375-CA
Case No. 980054-CA
Karin Sofia Ohlander,
Defendant an i Appellant

F I L E D
( J u l y 2 , 1998)

Fourth District, Provo Department
The Honorable Anthony W. Schofield
Attorneys

Daniel F. Bertch and Kevin K. Robson, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
Brian C. Harrison, Provo, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Greenwood.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Karin Sofia Ohlander appeals from a divorce decree
in Case No. 970375-CA (the "first appeal") and from an order
denying a motion to set aside the divorce decree in Case No.
980054-CA (the "second appeal").
Appellee Mark Andrew Larson sought dismissal of the first
appeal pursuant to D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) based upon Ohlander's contempt through failure to
comply with the district court's orders and decree. This court
granted Larson's motion to dismiss, subject to Ohlanderfs
satisfaction of specified conditions that would allow the first
appeal to continue. Larson now seeks dismissal of the second
appeal on the same basis.
This court has consistently held that an appellate court
possesses "discretionary authority to dismiss the appeals of
contumacious litigants under terms which are fair and just given
the circumstances of a particular case." Von Hake v. Thomas,
881 P.2d 895, 898 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In its order of April
14, 1998, this court conditionally granted the motion to dismiss
the first appeal. The court required that, in order to continue
her appeal, "appellant Karin Sofia Ohlander shall comply with the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Salt Lake City UT 84107
Brian C. Harrison
Hill, Harrison, Johnson & Schmutz
3319 N University #200
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deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed below:
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Fourth District Court
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SANDVIKEN DESiaiCr COURT

MINUTES OF PSEUMXKABY
HEAIING
in Saadvjkca on
2nd November 1S92
T 32/91
Amsx: 30

THECOUBT
Deputy Diarist Judge Joisn Alvner
SEBRES. OF THE MINUTES
Law Ckdc Marianas Lmdholm
fHIlllUNER
Karin SOFIA I !"•"", nai. res* 20- 671Q29-75C5, Grundbogaian 1 E,
S-S1X 30 SANDVIKEN; present in perns
Legal representative: Anita Wallin-Wlberg. Ancmsy-at-law, Box 1322,
S-801 38 SAKDVTKEN: present
RESPONDENT
MARK Andrew Larson, b. 6.11.65, cf 69 E
fit
• Jtth. 84606. USA;
put nut in person
Legal rearssenorive: 3engt Heraex. Atamey-si.law, Box 244, S-811 23
SANDVlkBN; present
CAUSE
Dtanfnricm of marriage etc
Bcngt Hennei subsrioed Mark Lassen's application for legal aid. Annex 31, and
staxsd as follows. Mark wasrinrnicirrim Swedes for tbent one year at tte age
of six or seven and then between 1985 and 1987. He carmnr af&sd to retain
wywyrl in Sweden cm of hi* own pocket and mere ate special grounds for
awarding him legal aid.
Anita WalHaWIherg, y—— t Sofia Lancn'i peine of claim, stated u fcllcwi.
Sofia Larson prays the District Court to sake a decree abtotam of divorce
batwesn me pardea by part-judgement and, also on an uunlnumuy basis* to
award net sole custody of taeir daughter Julia and to order Mark Laramto pay
her, unuunseatscs for tb« daughter, SEK L075 montniy for tn« period between
1st January ami 3 lit May 1991 andSEK 1,125 monthly from 15tb January 1992
and axil tea child is 18 yuus old.
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a
TTTTvmtsnnncc ciabns. For his own part* also on an xntcitxmory basil, Mark
Lanran m thf first instance ciaixas eartDriy of the daughter, Julia, and pays that
Sofia. ianou be ordered tn piy hia. ai roauzesance fhr their daughter, SEK
1,(173 rconthlyfromthe day ot tne D i a n e Courts ascpoiiiy artier in c s xnamr
until therigyghtrfis 12 ycui old, u £ ts itxs iccsnd instances, in the e t a s or
Sofia being awarded cuawly of Julia, icegss tD dieir daughter in the USA for two
waonucu* T™*"* annually for the period between 1993 and 1997 u d six weeka
annually thOTaftfiT. M a i * I IftOn CfiafinSS Julia's n e e d o f SUSSSntZXC 2t thfi

standard rate of SEK 1,075 monthly and his own ability 7) pay maintenance. In
the event of enatnoy of the A™?***? r^nj awarced to Sofia Larson. Mark has
discharged M* ^mr^ncgnhf^innn fbr ihs period gremlins 13th January 1952.
Anna Wallln Wibcrg stated a* folic v s . Sofia Larson c e m m the custody and
TrsfmimTiM claims. Julia's need of mainrrnsres is r.nnnrnirrt, bat Sofia Lanon
does Mt hive the fiifannnncresoarce*tn pay TnaTrurasrcx As regards the nuiody
claim. Sofia T arson COSKSU to Mirk Larson being firm a x opponuxsry of
saws to the child, bur not to the extsut clataesd and iad in the USA.
Anita WaHin Wxhert sratrri -further as fallows. Scfia L a o u sua Mark Ijuictu
ox the Chnrcn of Jesus Chriit of Latter-Day Saints, in 1986,
while be w u living in Sweden. Sofia visited Mart in tfte USA in 1989 and the
cnupie wens mimed in October i989. They settled in the USA and their rtamghtrr
Julia was born in August 1990. AAcr coiobratina Chrivffim in Sweden, Sofia
H*t»v4M tn rymiiw frgpg ^ 4 fo larrtittry 1 9 9 1 pTTTOOCd fttt 1 dJVOIM. Itt July 1 9 9 1

Sofia returned to Mark in the USA in a bid to uve their carriage! but tfc*
relationship was iixepsrablt. Sofia considrn Mark temperamental and uncoe*
trolled. He has a violent temper and has hit and Wcked Sofia in Julia's p a i n m .
Safta does not wisn tn leave Marie alone with JUlla andtearsthai Mark could
Kidnap Julia sen taks her 10 the USA. Mart's saeresi in Julk las grown sines
Sufi* brought their dsngntrr ts Swtoca. flerwesu July 1991 and January 1992,
when Sofia and Julia wtxe living with Mark in the USA. there was a lot oi
quarrelling and Sofia was forced to leave the USA without telling Mark: ia
advisee. gn«H«*»f up, it is Sofia who, ever sznee Julia « u born, has been
mainly responsible for her sad is best suited to loot ater her. John castody U not
feasible and ii is in Julia's ben uuereau for Sofia LO be awarded sole custody of
her.
Bengt Henssl stated as fellows. Sofia 1*& the USA ia November 1990. I: was
agreed that Mark should join her and that they were to crteftntn Chrinnia* with
Softs'* fzmdy in ^WCOCCL Sofia's idanvea persuaded ner to scay on in SwedOL
and Made w u iiccnily ilsuwn uutby tier raffiUy. Evidsody one of Sena's nunica
fr***y*+ had phoned* aayi^ that Mark inTffnrlrd to Iridmp Jullat which was a
nrrj^i^m UboatncaL Wfaca Sofia axsd Julia returned to the USA in the summer
ftf 1491. fiverymine went well to besin with. Olt in November 1991 ths
dp detJobotatBd uA Sofia xssuxaod to Sweden without telling Maxk first.
Jusiry tod J u s 1991, Mnrk contributed towards Julia's upkeep by
lafix SEK 5T500, Mark hsa a monthly ircunie of SEX. 12,100 (SEK.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

1Q,4Q0 an). Mark used to hive his own flat, but he is sow living with his
granomotber. Merle works in the optcs industry and has pienry of scope for
working overtime; this entities him to time off, over and above the regular two
weeks' paid holiday. If Juli* cornea to the USA, Mirk can work hstf-dme and
look after fasr «i«rmg his leisure. A brother, with a Swedish wife, and three
minied cousins iiYe in the satnc cir/f and so Mark has pienry of help available
for locking after Julia- While in Sweden Mark haa been allowed to mestJtxlit far
about 1Q hours, always hi the yitsrae? of Sofia and her relatives. Sofia has no
grounds whatsoever for denying ^i™ normal access to their daughter, and with
Sofia's ^tiFrtt to the r 1 **^ of access, ft is Made who is best suited for custody
of Julia. Mark is aware that a child needa both in parents and Sofia would be
given pienry of opportunity for regular access to Julia. If Sofia is awarded custody
of fheirrfmghterand Mark access, **»*»", while Julia is still too until to travel on
her own, Mark will coxnc to Sweden and coiled Julia and will then bring her
back to Sweden.
Anita Wallin Wiberg rated as follows. Sofia h^M sot received any financial
•ffffftw* towards Julia's upkeep. Co the other ftana she has received money
towards her miephnxm bill and towards the cost of forwarding luggage. As regards
the risk of kidnapping, Sofia's g^^e^ of recovering her qtuswrr if Mark should
keep her in the USA are fairly nan-existent. Sofia ia currently unemployed* She
previously bid a temporary tMrfwig job and ix now wailing to hear whether she
has been accepted for a study programme she hai applied for.
Bengt Ken&ei stated as fallows. Marx Larson confirms that Sofia Larson is
unemployed.
Sofia Larson stamd as follows. While she wss jiving in the USA. Mark had
outbursts of rage and thrxrw things, ofiea without her being able to understand
why. Mark has struck hsr and occasionally aiso kicked her. They differed on
many maaenu e.g. religion and child education. She returned to the USA because
she wanted the relationship to work, but it would act. Mark has never been
vioknr to Julia and now that they have met in Sweden things have gone well.
Sefia dng» net Imnw wtefliyr t\\e

fett

«f kr*faeping WM in ffinipff, buishedoea

not trust Mark. Mark «h<^H be allowed access to Julia but shnnlri not be allowed
to take her to the USA until Julia ia older.
Mark Larson stated aa follow*. He has always cared about Julia, but distance baa
made it hard to keep in touch with her. Previously Sofia alio prevented hhn from
™iir»wg to Julia en the phone. The relanaoihip between Hitw<g*f and Sofia broke
down and s**fla waa depraaed* felt bad and would not speak co her friends or
even meet thsm. There wnre two occaakms when he ' struckJ Sofia. One of them
was a purely reflex movement against Sofia's leg, and the second time waa a blow
which struck her on the cheek when she "exploded" in the car. Sofia can not have
been injured on either of theae occasions. He has never kirkflri her and never
anything at her or in such a way that there was a risk of her being struck.
taiv of kidnapping ia quits groundless. On the contrary, he has told her
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that ha would ncvtr go off with Julia the way Sofia, did when she rock Julia aM
left the USA without calling Urn first. Sofia sad Julia have a good relationship
and he wants it to contrmT If h^ is awarded custody, Julia will be ailowea to
visit Sofia in Sweden.
Anita Wallin Wibcxg stated a* follows. Sofia Larson conwraa to Marie Larson
berg allowed accrsi to Julia three tunes a year for one week at a time. Access
may be exercised In Sofia* i home or in some odier place on which the partita can
agree, but not in the USA.
Anita Wallin Wiberg claimed remuneranou in ararrnfanne with an expense
irrwmt, Annex 31, auhmiocd.
Tie proceedings having lasted from 11 a ^ to 12.25 p.m., were declared closed
with the announcement that a part-judgement and order would be made by being
made available in the Dittnct Coun Office on 13th November 1992 at 2 p.m.
Retiring to chambers, the Dinner Ccuxt made a part-judgement ana the following
ORDER (to be issued on i3th November 1992 at 2 p.m.).
Until such time as these matters have been detenrinad by a judicial decision
having force of law or by a decision to the contrary, the District: Court aiders
u follows.
1.

dismay of TITLIA Snfi*. nar, reg, Tin. 9QDB13-33ZS, Rhall cotsiSSfi m he
vested in Sofia Larson . sa ordered by the Diane: Court in its temporary
order atlOfe May 1991.

2.

The District Courtfindsno cause to amend its temporary order cf 1 Oth May
1991 in the maner cf ^ * ^ ^ ^ r * . , which order shall accordingly remain in.
force.

3.

Mark Larson shall be ****** to acceu to the daughter. Julia* for one
y*tmr*t in the year, at a d*^ to be agreed on in detailtecrweeuthe names.

Anita Wallin Wiberg is awarded an advance payment of SEX 9,S5Q under the
Legal Aid Act. In view of the rxilea concerning p a y n ^
thia
entire amount «***» be disbursed out of public funds.
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Any appeal tpisst this order ihaii t * made sepiraieiy, by limited appeal not
later than 4th December 1992.
Date as above,
(Sgiumat:)
Marianne Lindholm
Recast read and approved/ (Initials)
(Stamp:)
SANDVIKEN DISTRICT COURT
For a true copy,
(Slgnctiurej
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THE COURT OF APPEAL
FOR SOUTHERN NORRLAND

RECORD OF HEARING
ia Sondavail on
:3tb.D«cBmber 1992

sag
Aansx: 1C
6 1180/92

THE COURT
- Chaster Berg, Appellate Caet Judge
Gflit* Grefcerg, Appellate Court Judas Referee
Xrama Bracefagrg, A o c g Appellate Ccuit Judge
KWWUWU O F

'

THB MINUTES

The Refines
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AND OPPONENT (not present)
Karia SOFIA Linen, OIL reg. no. 671029-7505.' Plangatan 4 C,
S-Sll 29 SANDVTKEH
Legal rcpresemariVB and counsel uiaier the Legai Aid Act: Anita Wailin Wiberg,
Attetoey-at-Uw, Box 1333. S-S01 38 GAVLE
VARIOUSLY APPELLANT AND OPPONENT {act present)
MABS Andrew r«rtm1 b. 6.11.65, ddzsa of the United States of America, 69
E 600 N Prove, Utah 84606, USA
Legal representative and counsel usder the Legal AM Ace Eengt fffrmrt,
ABorney-at-iaw, Box 244. S-811 23 SANDVIKEN
CAUSE
Temporary order ccssersrng right of acceia to child e s .
TEBnHlflN UONTUSlfaD
Made by the Sasdviken District Ccun on 13th November 1992 in cue no. T
33/91.

The case hging ptssascd by Trainee Denary Judge Sten Ekstrand, the Court of
Appeal noted as follow*.
In her application of 30th January 1991 far a -writ of smnTnnni against Made
Larson. Sofia T ar**" prayed, the District Cater TD asks a Hmrn •twnhtte of
divorce Between them and. also an an mxriocsrnry basis, to award her caatody
.. ... _ ^ .of their child JULIA Sorla.nac.rcg. no. 900813-3929. and to order Mark farton
/ ^ " ^ A^J^smpay SEX 1,078 mahssasnee monthly for their dragster, with crxset riom 2Sxh
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January 1991 asd until die child is 18 yean oid, accrued amounts to be paid
frnraKtiaffiy and snhsrqnrflt nmnuTiTi in advance of each calendar manm*
Mark Lazson having been served with the suasions application and a special
iejuisa inn bur noticing having been heard from him thereafter, die Disrnci Court,
on iOfli May 1991 and until such tunc as these questions were derided by a
judgcznenr having force of law or pending decision to the contrary, the District
Court nude an order in accordance wiih.Sofia Larson's points of claim in the
my|PTf of custody flrrf wt ^ y nn!ic f 'i thmigfr without i ^ i ^ i n g tH^f accrued
amounts of maintenance vrcre to be paid immediately.
At & preliminary hearing on 2sd November 1992. Sc^Laaon prayed the District
Court to make a decree absolute of divorce between the parnes by paix-judgcmcnt
and. also, on an interiocumry basis, tn swam her sole custody of their ^ugim—
Julia and to order Mark Lanon to pay her, as mamiecance for their daughter,
3E£ 1,075 monthly for the period between 1st January and 31st May 1991
inchudvi, and SE£ 1,125 monthly as from 15th January 1992 and until the child
is 18 years eld. Mark Larson cunsetucri to the divorce claim but causssd the
custody and ^itntgng™^ claims. He confirms SE3C 1,075 per monxh ai reasonable
tnaimsnanffc but claimed that he had discharged his nwhTenancc obligation fcr the
period preceding 15tii January 1992. For his own pin. also on an insriecatory
basis, ha claimed, in the first instance, sole custody of the riattghtrr and
maintenance for her. In the second instance, in the event of Sofia Larson being
awardad custody of the daughter, Mark Larson also on an interlocutory basis,
prayed that ho be awarded right of access to the daughter for two continuous
months per annum between 1993 and 1997 and for six weeks pear annum
thereafter, custody to be exercised in the USA. Sofia T arson contested Mark
Larson1! custody and maimmanca claims. As regards the custody claim. Sofia
Larson T^pfgrrri to Mark Larson being enridnd to access to the child three times
annually fcr one wee* at a time, the access to be exercised in her hems or in
soma other place on which the parcel were able to agree, but not in the USA.
On 13th November 1992, p8™*™!! the deteroutianon of these matters by a
jrn»^i mil iiu...|i fr*vm-ryf-i*m or rtrriiinn m rhr ;inntiary, the District Coin
ordered as toilowi:
(1)

Custody of the ^sMgir^ of the parries, Julia, shall continue, as ordered by
tl» District Court m its temporary order of 10th May 1991, to be vested in
Sofi* Larson.

(2)

The District Ccun flreis no cause to amend its temporary onler of 10th May
1991 in the ™«™-«»of maintenance* which order shall accordingly remain In
fore.

(3)
*- V "jkuirrT"^

• •

Mark Larson ?b<ril be entitled to access to the daughter, Julia, for one
mash in the year, at a time to be agreed on m. detail between the parties.
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In its pan-judgement of L3th November 1992, the Diitrx: Court marie a decree
absolute of divorce between the parties.
Sofia, ^ w n an: Mark Larson have filed scparzie appeal against the District
Corn's cnicr of 13ch November 1992, and ia doing 50 presented the following
point* of claim.
Sella Larson has prayed the Coon of Appeal to set Mark Lanoa's rignt of
temporary acceai to theirfaiigflrcrJulia at one week during the autumn term, one
naqgfrrfrwwjnfrg gprirg ***** *"° ""*» ^g^g in ***^ aummgr mrmrh*. She baa ftahCT

stipulated that the acceas ahall take place hi her home or in another place in
Sweden which ihs may ^ l f g t l > , that access s a y not be exerciaed during the
Christmas and New Year holiday and on.no position in the USA, and that the
time of acceai shall be decided two week* in advance of each occaahm, with
Mark Larson notifying her of hia wishes.
Mark Larson has prayed the Conn of Appeal to award him right of temporary
access m the ***"gtffgr of the paxtea, Julia, in the USA for a period of two
continuous mnr^^ annua tiy, subject to hia being obliged, not leas than one month
before the t o e when he Wmfr access to begin, to notify Sena Larson accordingly, and also to set his temporary maintenance obligation to Sofia. Larson at SEK
1,075 monthly a* from lith January 1992T payable in advance of each «!»*«*•»
month.
Sofia Larson and Maxk Lanon have comestsd each other's amendment claina.
The Court of Appeal makes the following
FINAL ORDER
In view of the child's age and other circumstances, it is appropriate that Mark
Larson's rights of temporary srrrti to the daughter. Julia, should be defined as
referring to access in Sweden and should mainly bo arranged in accordance with
Sofia Lanoa's pcasinn to Court of AppcaL
In the miner of ™»™f«**»™^ it follow* from the provisions of Chap. 7, Sfcrioa
LS of the Code of Pares&ood and Guardianship that a temporary mainteaaoet
order can it any nose be amended by the Court aa regards the ongoing maintenance obligation, whereas reappraisal of such an order, with resosctive effect,
shall not take place "**+* the case has been determined. Thus the rtrcision
conrntfd shall be deemed to comprise Mart Larson's obligation, for the period
from 13th November 1991 until the child is 13 years old, to pay SHS 1,078
maintenance monthly for the *m$p*T in advance of each calendar month. The
Court of Appeal fuadj no euue for am 11 ruling cbs order reus mad*.

Av^.With TBfr^fjt^ to the above, the Court of Appeal amends the cammed decision
^3aofar aa me Court of AppcaL p^^^g the dasmnination of the maser by judicial
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decision or an enter hiving gained fores of law, or pending decision to toe
contrary, orders ttiir Mart L i n m shall hxve a right of access to theriiuigtimof
the pomes, Juik Sofia, not. rcg. no. 900813-3929, for one week between toe
months of January and May, twojveoa between ±omon±a of June acdAaguK
and one -week before the months of Scprernher and December, though act daring
the Chriatmti ox New Year holiday. Acceu may <airj be eawciscd in Sweden,
at a place designated by Sofia. Larson and at the exact does which, Mark Larson
having apprised Sofia Larson of hh pic:crcacesf have been decided two 'weeks in
tdvance of every occasion.
For serriccs rendered in the Coon of Appeal p:occsritngtt The Coon of Appeal
awards Ansa W&Uin Wtberg 3EK 1.7S0 and Bsngt Kennel SESL 2.670 u
rernuneranon under the Legal Aid Act.

Tssnoscnnss FOR APPEAL
Any appeal lgniait the vir**ftf jt—rTprvritm ** Af,<Ta Wtiifawihgf* a«a Wj-wp
HT*"»»* shall be cade, by limited anpeaL not lxer man Tuesday, 9th Febmary
1993.
Under Chap. 20, Section 12(3) of the Code of Parenthood and Guirniarabip, no
appeal can be r"ttH» against die Conn of Appeal's decision on otter respects. For
ttUtrnctians f^Trnrnirg proseconm of appeal proceedings, see enclosure.
(Signature:)
Keeper of the Misues
Record read and approved 12.1.1993/(2Mttabj
Given 12m January 1993
(Stmta.'i
COURT OF APPEAL FOR
SOUTHERN NORRLAND
For a true copy i
(Signature)
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SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE
OTJDGHSNT

COURT
Case no.
4S36-199S

delivered in Scockholra on Decerrber 20, 1295

COMPLAINANT
Sofia Ohlander, personal identification no. 671C297505, of Piangatan 6 C, 811 39 Sandviken
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act:
Anita Wallintfiberg,Attcrney-at-law, Advokatfiman
Hahne & Co, Box 1333, 801 33 GAvle
OPPOSITE PAXTY
Marfc parson, date of birth Ncvember 3, 1955, of 636
South S50 Ease, Oreiri, Utah 84C58, USA
Representative and counsel under the Legal Aid Act:
?redric Rens tron, Attomey-at-law, 3irger Jarlsgatan
13,
111 45 Stockholm
AGAINST A COURT DECISION
Judgment delivered by Sundsvali Administrative Court
of Appeal on August 25, 1955 in case no. 2513-1995
(Annex)

XBVEIOJ

MATTER
Return of a child pursuant to the Act (1989:14)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DEMANDS

ETC •

Sofia Ohlander demands chat the Supreme
administrative Court alter the judgment c£ the
Administrative Court of Appeal, dismissing Mark
Larson's suit and withdrawing that judgment* She
also demands that the Supreme Administrative Court
shall obtain information/a report from the social
welfare committee in'Sundsvall about Julia!s present
home conditions and that this report should be
completed with a report from the Children's and
Adolescents' Psychiatric Clinic for the purpose of
establishing how the child has adjusted to Sweden and whether returning her would entail serious risks
co her mental or physical health. In support of her
suit in respect of the return of Julia, Sofia
Ohlander has adduced the following. After her birth
Julia has resided in Sweden ever since November/
1990, with the exception of seven months during 1991
and two months at the turn of 1993/1994. Mark Larson
tcck the law into his own hand3 when he fetched l
Julia in November, 1393. In 1992 and 1993 Mark Larson took parr in the Swedish custody proceedings,
thus accepting Swedish jurisdiction. In view of
Sofia Ohlanderls intension of remaining in Sweden
with Julia and the length of time that Julia has
spent in Sweden, her adjustment to this country and
Hark Larscn's passivity, it must be concluded that
in February, 1594 Julia's habitual residence was
Sandviken.
Mark Larson contests the granting of the appeal and
the demand that the Supreme Administrative Court
arrange for further investigation in the case. In
support cf his suit he has adduced the following. He
has never accepted that Julia should live in Sweden.
nor that Sofia Ohlander should have custody of her.
Julia was residing in the USA in January/February,
1994 when Sofia Shlarider unlawfully abducted h*r.
Subsequently, Sofia Ohlander a&s prevented all
contacts between him and Julia,
In its decision of August 30, 1995 th<* Supremo
Administrative Court ordered a stay of execution of
the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal
with regard to the return of Julia.
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The evidence in the case has established the
following facts. Mark Larson and Sofia Ohlander were
married en October 21. 1989 in the USA and their
daughter Julia was born there on August 13, 1990.
The fairily went to Sweden in Ncvember, 1990, after
which Mark Larson returned to the USA alone in the
beginning of January, 1591. That same month Sofia
Ohlander filed a petition for divorce and sole
custody of Julia at Sandviken District Court. In
Kay, 1591 she was awarded temporary custody of her
daughter. In June, 1591 she went to the USA with
Julia, but returned to Sweden in January, 1992, on
which occasion she took her daughter with her
without Mark Larson's consent. When the qualifying
period for the divorce expired, Sofia Ohlander
proceeded with her divorce suit- In November, 1992
verbal proceedings were held in the divorce case, as
a result of which Sofia Ohlander was awarded
continued temporary custody of her daughter and Mark
Larson was granted visiting rights. In May, 1993
Kark Larson paid a short visit to Sweden, The couple
were divorced the same year. In November, 1993 Mark
and his new wife visited Sweden, and subsequently
took Julia to the USA without Sofia Ohlander's
consent. In January, 1994 Sofia Shlander went to the
USA. Under an ex parte order she was provisionally
awarded custody of Julia without the right to leave
the USA. However, on February 2, 1954 she took Julia
with her to Sweden, where they have lived ever
since. On January 27, 1595 22ark Larson filed a
petition with the Gavieborg County Administrative
Court for the return of Julia to the USA under the
Act (1589:14) concerning the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Decisions relating to Custody
etc. and concerning the Return of Children (the
Enforcement Act) .
The provisions of the Enforcement Act concerning the
return of children are based on the Convention
adopted by the Hague Conference in 19SO on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Hague
Convention). A general objective of the Convention
is to protect children against the harmful effects
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of being uprooted from their familiar environment:.
For thi3 purpose the Convention includes provisions
making it possible for a child who has been
unlawfully abducted from one State Party to another
to be speedily returned to the former 30 as to
restore the status quo. The Convention has been
incorporated into Swedish law insofar as provisions
intended to reproduce the provisions of the
Convention have been included in the Enforcement
Act. The section that isroostrelevant to the case
is section 11 of the Enforcement Act, which
corresponds to Articles 3 and 12, paragraph 1 of the'
Hague Convention. As will be explained in greater
detail below, the main issue in this case is whether
the abduction of Julia on February 2, 1994 from the
USA to Sweden was unlawful within the meaning of the
above section.
Pursuant to section 11. subsection 1 cf the
Enforcement Act, a chile who has unlawfully been
brought to this country, or who is unlawfully held
in custody here, shall upon demand be returned to
the person from whom the child is bfcing withheld if
the child resided, in a State Party immediately prior
to the abduction cr holding in custody. Under
section 11, subsection 2. an abduction or holding in
custody is unlawful if it conflicts with the
guardian's or another person's right to the custody
of the child in the state where the child resided
immediately prior to the abduction cr holding in
custody, provided that this right was exercised at
the time when the child was abducted or held in
custody, or would have been exercised if the
abduction or holding in custody had not taken place.
Under the Act the question of who was the child's
guardian at the time of the abduction and the
question of whether the abduction was unlawful is to
be decided in accordance with the law in the st.«*t«t
in which the child resided at the time of the
abduction (section 11, subsection 2 and the special
statement of reasons on this section in Gov. Bill
1933/89:8, p. 40; see also the provisions of
sections 14 and 23, subsection 1 of the Act}.
Another consequence of these provisions is tiiat the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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abduction of a child from another state to Sweden is
not unlawful within the meaning of the Act if the
child resided in Sweden immediately prior to the
abduction. The meaning or the tern residence is thus
crucial to the application of the provisions of the
Snforcezaent Act that relate to the return of a
child.
A Swedish court deciding on a petition to return a
child from Sweden to another country must make an
independent decision on the residence of the child
at the time to which section 11. subsection 2 of the
Enforcement Act is applicable. The term residence is
ncn defined in the Enforcement Act. In the
legislative history of the Act (Gcv. 3ill 1933/89:8,
pp. 36 and 40) reference was made to the
pronouncements on residence made in connection with
the incorporation in 1973 of this term in chapter 7,
section 2 of the Act (1904:35 s. 1) on Certain
Matters of International Law concerning Marriage and
Guardianship. (The pronouncements are contained in
Gov. Bill 1973:153. p-p- 73). This definition and the
pronouncements in the Bill cited above formed the
basis of the definition of the ter^i residence
applied in subsequent Swedish legislation and. in
case law on international family law and related
fields (see, for example, Gov. Bills 1932/83:38, pp.
12 ff. and 1984/35:124, p. 40, and NJA (New
Juridical Archives) 1377, p. 706, 1983, p. 359 and
1987, p. 60C).
Thus, although the legislative history cf the
Enforcement Act refers to the need, in connection
with the application of the provisions of the Act
that relate to the return of a child, to tak* into
account the definition of the ter^i residence used in
other national legislation, it rrost nevertheless be
borne in mind that the Enforcement Act is arj Act
governed by the provisions of an international
convention. In interpreting this concept it is
therefore appropriate tc take particular notice of
the terrrJLnology and purpose of the Hague Convention.
The expression "residence" in the Enforcement Act
corresponds to the expression "habitual residence"
or "residence habituelle" in the Hague Convention.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This concept has long been well-established within
the framework on the Kagrue Conference, and it is
used in several nf the conventions adopted by the
Conference. These conventions do not contain an
explicit definition of the concept, but according to
the references in the relevant literature the tern
relates primarily to the actual circumstances (seer
inter alia, Che summary in SOU (Gov. Official
Reports) 1976:39, pp. 119-122). Basically, an allround appraisal must be made cf such verifiable
circumstances as the length of the stay and social
attachments and other circumstances of a personal cr
professional nature that indicate a lasting
connection with one country or the other. The
individual's intention whether or not to stay in the
country of residence can also be taken into account,
but the current view appears to be that, as a rule,
no great importance should be attached to subjective
factors- In the case of a child who is not old
enough to make it possible to consider his or her
intentions regarding the future, other circumstances
- in particular, the residence of the guardian./ and
the home and social conditions - must obviously b«
decisive. The question has been formulated in terns
of where the child's "effective life center" is (cf.
SCC 1976:39, p. 120 and Gov. Bill 1984/85:24, p.
42) . A pcint that should always be considered when
interpreting the term 'habitual residence", as well
as the Swedish concept or residence, is that the
purpose of the rules containing the term should be
taken into account, and that interpretations may
therefore differ depending on the context.
A special issue as regards the residence of small
children is what rules to apply in cases where the
parents have joint custody of the child and the
child is moved from one country to another against
the will of one o£ th^ guardians. It hes been
asserted on various occasions that such changes of
residence should not result in the child acquiring a
new residence (see, for example, the references
quoted by 3ccdan in Tidskrift for Juridiska
Fdreningen i Finland 1982, p. 118, note 38, and NJA
1995, p. 241) . However, the sphere of application of
this principle is not clear (cf. 3ogdan, ibzd.,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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118-112, Pdlsson, Svensk rlttspraxis i
international fartilje- och arvsritt, yg>- 104-108
and NJA 1974, p. 390 and p. 529 I and II) , With
particular reference to the Enforcement Act and the
Hague Convention on which it is based, it should be
taken into account that one general objective, as
has already been mentioned/ is to protect children
against the harmful effects of being uprooted from
their familiar environment, and that one of the
functions of the term residence for the purposes of
the Act, like "habitual residence" in the
Convention, is to specify the kind of connection
with a country that givss the right to protection
under the Act and the Convention, respectively. It
is not consistent with this objective for an
abduction against the will of one of the child's
guardians to be instrumental in chancrinqr the child's
residence- On the ether hand, it does no: seem
entirely consistent with that objective to regard
the circumstances cf the abduction as a permanent
obstacle to the establishment of a new residence. If
the child has be^n in the new country for such a
length of time and under such conditions that it has
acquired a ccrnert.inr. with the country of the kind
referred to in the provisions, there should be no
obstacle to considering that it has acquired a new
residence. Particular note should be taken in this
connection of the fact that under the previsions of
section 12 cf the Enforcement Act, as well as
Article 12 cf the Convention, the return of a child
that ha3 been unlawfully abducted may be refused
where, at the time of the submission of an
application for the child's return, at least one
year has passed from the time of abduction and the
child has settled down in its new environment,
A matter that must be resolved in this case is
whether the abducticn of Julia from the USA to
Sweden in February, 1994 was unlawful within the
meaning of tha Enforcement Act. From the abov*
remarks it is clear that the abduction cannot be
regarded as unlawful it Julia's residence at the
time of the abduction was Sweden* The evidence shews
that Julia arrived in Sweden together with her
mother Sofia Qhlancer in January, 1992 and that she
subsequently lived with her mother in Sandviken up
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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until November, 19S3, when Marx. Larscn took her to
the USA without her mother's consent. Nor is there
any doubt thai: Sofia Chlander acquired Swedish
residence after her arrival in Sweden. The
circumstances related above and the other
information that has been supplied about Julia1s
s^ay with her mother and her adjustment to
conditions in Sandviken also clearly indicate that
she had acquired Swedish residence some time prior
to her abduction to the USA in November, 1993.
However, in conformity with the abov« reasoning, the
circumstances in which Julia was taken back to
Sweden in January, 1992 should also be taken into
account in an assessment of her residential status.
The investigation supports Mark Larson's claim thnt
the abduction took place against his will. However,
he did not file a petition for the return of the
child following the abduction. Considering this
face, the circumstances in connection with the
abduction in January, 1932 should not. on expiry of
the tveive-menth period referred to in both the
Enforcement Act and the Convention, prevent the
child from acquiring residence in Sweden. In view of
the above account of Julia's stay in Sweden and her
adjustment to Swedish conditions, the Supreme
Administrative Ccurt finds that she muse be
considered to have acquired Swedish residence some
time before November, 1993, when she was taker* back
to the USA by Mark Larson. The subsequent events Julia's abduction to the USA and her stay there
lasting over two montrxs •• cannot once again have
changed her residential status. Consequently,
pursuant to section 11, subsection 2 of the
Enforcement Act, she must be deemed still to have
had Swedish residence at the time of the abduction
from the USA in February. 1994 that is a~ issue in
this case.
The abduction in February, 1594 was therefore not
unlawful within the meaning of aection 11,
3uhsection 2 of the Enforcement Act. Consequently,
the provisions of the enforcement Act offer no
possibility of returning Julia to the USA. Sofia
Ohlander's main suit shall therefore be granted.
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In view of this ruling, no measures arcs necessary
with regard to Sofia Ohlander'* demand for further
investigation in respect of Julia,
The matter of the parties' legal costs remains to be
settled. Sofia Shlander's suit implicitly include* a
demand that she be released from the obligation to
pay Mark Larson's legal costs in the lower courts This matter must be decided in accordance with the
provisions of section 21 of the Enforcement Act and
chapter 21, section 13, subsection 1 of the Code on
Parents, Children and Guardians. Cnder those
provisions the court may, where this is deemed
reasonable, order a party to pay the other party's
legal costs. Cn the basis of an overall assessment
cf the case the Supreme Administrative Court finds
than there is no reasonable cause for either of the
parties to be obliged to pay the other party's legal
costs. This applies to the parties' legal costs both
in the lower courts and in the Supreme
Administrative Court. Therefore, Sofia Ohlander's
suit shall also be granted in this regard.

©BCISION OF THS

SUPREME

ADMINISTRATIVE

COURT

The Supreme Administrative Court reverses the
judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal and
upholds the judgment of the County Administrative
Court in the matter of the return cf the child.
Reversing the judgment of the Administrative Court
of Appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court releases
Sofia Ohlander from the obligation to pay Mark
Larson's legal costs in the lower court3.
The Supreme Administrative Court rules that
remuneration shall be paid under the Legal Aid Act
in the amount of 16 218 kronor tc Anita Wallin
wiberg, Attorr.ey-at-law, for her work as counsel for
Sofia Ohlander and in the amount of 12 4C2 kronor to
Fredric Renstrom, Attcrney-at-law, for his work as
counsel for Mark Larscn. Neither party shall be
obliged to pay the other party's legal costs in the
Supreme Administrative Court.
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/signature/
Stig Brink

/signature/
Elisabeth Palm

/signature/
Sigvard Berglof

/signature/
Anders Swartling

/signature/
Arne Baekkevold

/signature/
Anr-a-Karin Horfsfcedt
Reading Clerk to the Supreir.e
Administrative Court

Div. Ill
Presented on October 31, 1995

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that this is a true translation of
cne original Swedic

O'J/U

•vA-V

/

J

Robert ?. Cro£ts
January 9. 1295

Certified Public Translator fresi
Swedish into English and froci
English into Swedish accredited
by the Swedish Board of Trade
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HILL, HARRISON, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ
Brian C. Harrison
Attorney for Plaintiff
3319 North University Avenue, #200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 375-6600
Utah State Bar #1388

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARK ANDREW LARSON,
Plaintiff,

]
])
•

DECREE OF DIVORCE
NUNC PRO TUNC

-vsKARIN SOFIA LARSON, aka
KARIN SOFIA OHLANDER,
Defendant.

J
)
]

Civil No. 944402943

This matter came on regularly for hearing on October 18, 1996,
Plaintiff being present and represented by his attorney, Brian C.
Harrison, and the Defendant being represented by her attorney,
Daniel Bertch, and the parties' minor child being represented by
the Guardian Ad Litem, Lorie Fowlke.

The Court, having considered

the argument of counsel and having reviewed the file and being
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fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of
Fact said Conclusions of Law;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

1.

This Court has jurisdiction over the divorce and custody

matters and personal jurisdiction over the parties.
2.
tunc,

Plaintiff is hereby granted a decree of divorce, nunc

pro

effective October 21, 1993.
3.

In accordance with Article IV of the Constitution of the

United States of America and U.S.C. 11603(a), this Court affords
full faith and credit to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law,

and Order and Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Utah, dated June 12, 1995, in the Hague Convention case filed by
Sofia.
4.

None of the temporary custody orders obtained by Sofia in

Sweden have ever been granted legal recognition under the Utah
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-l
through -26 (1992 & Supp. 1994), and they have no legal force or
validity in the State of Utah.

2
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5.

Neither party is awarded alimony.

$.

The present distribution of personal property and debts

is hereby confirmed.
7.

Permanent sole custody of the parties' minor child, Julia

Sofia Larson, is hereby awarded to Mark.
8.

Sofia is awarded liberal visitation both in Utah and in

Sweden, subject to appropriate restrictions that will ensure that
she does not violate Mark's rights of custody.
9.

Both parties are ordered to actively help Julia acquire

and maintain the ability to communicate fluently in both English
and Swedish.
10.

Sofia is ordered to immediately return Julia to Utah and

turn her over to Mark.

To assist in making the transition easier

for Julia, Sofia is granted daily visitation with Julia in Utah
during an initial 3-week ^break-in" period, which visitation shall
be arranged and overseen by the Guardian Ad Litem.
11.

If Sofia fails to turn Julia over to Mark within 14 days

of the entry of this decree, all law enforcement officers or other
appropriate authorities of the State of Utah, the United States of

1

-
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American, the country of Sweden, or any other jurisdiction where
the child may be located, are ordered to immediately pick up the
parties' minor child, Julia Larson, and turn her over to her
father, Mark Larson.
12.

Mark is awarded child support from Sofia in accordance

with the Utah State child support guidelines.

Mark is not and

shall not be required to pay child support to Sofia for the times
when she is or has been unlawfully withholding Julia in violation
of his custody rights.

Mark is entitled to claim Julia as a

dependent for tax purposes, starting on the tax return due April
15, 1997.
13.

Sofia is in contempt of court for her willful violations

of this Court's orders dated March 19, 1996, and September 3, 1996.
14.

Sofia is ordered to immediately pay Mark the two $750

judgments already entered against her, as well as an additional
$750 as a sanction for her contempt of the temporary custody order
dated March 19, 1996, and $500 for her willful failure to answer
Plaintiff's

Interrogatories

and

Requests

for

Production

of

Documents as ordered on September 3, 1996, for a total of $2,750.

4
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15.

As long as either party remains a resident of the State

of Utah, this Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to modify,
negate, or supersede any of the terms of this decree.
16.

This Court respectfully requests the Swedish courts, law

enforcement officers, and other authorities to recognize, honor and
enforce this decree.
DATED this

IH-

M«i

day of

, 1997.

BY THE COURT:

I

JUDGE ANTHONY W. SC^OFIELD
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

5
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States District Court for the District of Utah,
Bruce S. Jenkins, J., denied motion, and
subsequently ordered child's return to United States. Mother appealed. The Court of
Appeals,
Brorby, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
CONCLUSION
district court abused its discretion in denying
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the motion to dismiss solely on basis of mother's
fendants' motion to recall our mandate in contempt of its order not to remove child,
t Indian Tribe III 773 F.2d 1087 (10th and (2) dismissal of mother's petition was
-.1985) (en banc), cert denied, 479 U.S. warranted.
I, 107 S.Ct. 596, 93 L.Ed.2d 596 (1986).
Reversed and remanded with instructher, we MODIFY our mandate in Ute
iian Tribe III as set out above and RE- tions.
LND with instruction that the district
Murphy, Circuit Judge, dissented and
rt consider the Tribe's request for perma- filed opinion.
it injunctive relief in light of this opinion.

e Uncompahgre Reservation, and the three
sputed categories of non-trust lands disssed above.6

1. Federal Courts <3=>818
Court of Appeals will review district
court's decision to deny voluntary dismissal
after defendant has filed answer for abuse of
discretion. Fed.Ruies Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2),
28 U.S.CA

: «Y NUMB«SYSTIM>

in Sofia OHLANDER, In the Matter of
ilia Larson, a Minor Child, #Wa Karin
>fia Larson, Petitioner-Appellant,
ark Andrew LARSON, RespondentAppellee.
Nos. 95-4114 & 96-4080.
United States Court of Appeals,
Tenth Circuit.
June 3, 1997.
Uter father took child from Sweden to
d States without mother's permission,
*r, a Swedish citizen, filed Hague Con>n petition seeking child's return to
2n. Mother subsequently took child
United States to Sweden, in violation of
order, and was found in contempt Fahen filed Hague Convention petition in
in for return of child to United States.
T filed motion to voluntarily dismiss
listrict court petition. The United
decline to address whether any portion of
ion-trust lands opened in 1905 might still
itute Indian country under section 1151(b)
"dependent Indian community" because

2. Federal Civil Procedure <2>170O
Absent legal prejudice to defendant, district court normally should grant voluntary
dismissal after defendant has filed answer.
Fed.Ruies
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
U.S.OA.
3. Federal Civil Procedure <5=>1700
In determining whether defendant
would suffer legal prejudice from voluntary
dismissal after defendant has filed answer,
district court should consider, among other
relevant factors, defendant's effort and expense in preparing for trial, excessive delay
and lack of diligence on part of plaintiff,
insufficient explanation of need for dismissal,
and present stage of litigation. Fed.Ruies
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA.
4. Federal Civil Procedure <s>1700
Each factor considered in determining
whether defendant would suffer legal prejudice from voluntary dismissal after defendant
has filed answer need not be resolved in
favor of plaintiff for dismissal to be appropriate, nor need each factor be resolved in favor
that question is not properly before the court.
The district court may be asked to consider the
question upon remand.
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of defendant for denial of motion to be proper. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28
U.S.C.A.
5. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700
In determining: whether to grant voluntary dismissal after defendant has filed answer, district court should endeavor to insure
that substantial justice is afforded to both
parties. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28
U.S.CA
6. Federal Civil Procedure <s> 1693, 1700
In determining whether to grant voluntary dismissal after defendant has filed answer, court must consider equities not only
facing defendant, but also those facing plaintiff; court's refusal to do so is denial of full
and complete exercise of judicial discretion.
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
U.S.CA
7. Federal Civil Procedure @=*1700
When considering motion to voluntarily
dismiss case after defendant has filed answer, court must remember that the important factors in determining legal prejudice
are those involving parties, not court's time
or effort spent on case. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
8. Federal Civil Procedure <3=*1700
Court abuses its discretion when it denies motion to voluntarily dismiss case after
defendant has filed answer based on its own
inconvenience.
Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA
9. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700
District court abused its discretion when
it denied mother's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague Convention petition for return of
child to Sweden solely on grounds of her
contempt of its order not to remove child,
and without considering any additional circumstances, including merits of motion. International Child Abduction Remedies Act,
§ 4, 42 U.S.CA. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.
Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA
10. Federal Civil Procedure <3=*1693
Whether motion to voluntarily dismiss
case after defendant has filed answer may be
granted is matter initially left to district

court's discretion, but such discretion does
not excuse court's failure to exercise any
discretion, nor does it save unpermitted exercise of discretion from reversal. Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.
11. Federal Courts &=>$ 12
Court abuses its discretion when it fails
to consider applicable legal standard or facts
upon which exercise of its discretionary judgment is based.
12. Federal Courts <s>937.1
Although district court's failure to apply
correct legal standard when it denied mother's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague
Convention petition for return of child to
Sweden could serve as basis for remand,
Court of Appeals would determine merits of
mother's motion, as no dispute regarding
underlying facts existed and record was adequate to address issues of concern. Fed.
Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA
13. Federal Civil Procedure <£=>1700
Mother should have been allowed to voluntarily dismiss her Hague Convention petition for return of child to Sweden, after
mother had taken child to Sweden and father
had filed his own Hague Convention petition,
in Sweden, for return of child to United
States, as father would not suffer legal prejudice from dismissal, claims and defenses of
both mother and father could be more fairly
adjudicated in Sweden, and failure to grant
motion to dismiss could create new incentive
for parents to flee Hague Convention proceedings in hope of obtaining second, more
favorable Convention determination in another country. International Child Abduction
Remedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.CA. § 11603;
Fed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
U.S.CA
14. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>1701.1 ,
For purposes of determining whether
mother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss
her Hague Convention petition for return Of
child to Sweden, there was no improper d£lay or lack of diligence on mother's part
sufficient to legally prejudice father. Inter* ;
national Child Abduction Remedies Act, ,j( 4/ ;
42 U.S.CA § 11603; Fed.Rules CivJProfc \
Rule 41(a)(2), 28 U.S.CA
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L,Federal Civil Procedure <s»1700 . .;.
" For purposes of determining whether
tother was entitled to voluntarily dismiss
er Hague Convention petition for return-of
lild to Sweden, reasons mother gave'for'
ranting motion to dismiss, including contenon that petition was moot because child was;
) longer in United States, that Hague Conmtion allowed for dismissal of proceedings
ider such circumstances, and that father
id initiated duplicative action in Sweden,
ere-not insufficient such that* theypreju^
ced father. International Child Abductionemedies Act, § 4, 42 U.S.C.A.' § 11603;
ed.Rules
Civ.Proc.Rule
41(a)(2), 28
S.C.Ai. Federal Civil Procedure <s=>780
Hague Convention petition father filed
Sweden for return of his child to United
ates would not be construed as counteriim to mother's prior Hague Convention
stition, filed in United States, foj* return of
ild to Sweden, as father's claims were asrted in court of another jurisdiction. Inrnational Child Abduction Remedies Act,
4, 42 U.S.OA. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.
•oc.Rule 8(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

International Child Abduction Remedies Act,.
§.4(b, e), 42 U.S.CJL § 11603(b, e).
, ,
19. Contempt <s=>70

, ,t

.

a

. Court's interest in ensuring party's compliance with its orders is great one, enforce^
able by fines or imprisonment
• ..».:!.!< i
20. Contempt <s=>70

•, . >• ,. >'.*.;

!

When imposing civil contempt sanctions,
court is obliged to use least possible power,
adequate to end proposed. .,»
i. . .».»,'
;

•.' t

21. Parent and Child e=»18
Treaties <s=» 13
District court should not have denied
mothers motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague
Convention petition for return of child to*
Sweden, as civil contempt sanction for mother's conduct in taking child back to Sweden
in violation of court order, as other measures
were available to compel compliance with
order, such as personal sanctions against'
mother, or possibly staying decision pending
child's return. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, §§ 4, 5, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 11603,11604.

. Federal Civil Procedure <3=>1700
In determining whether to grant moth's motion to voluntarily dismiss Hague
invention petition for return of child to'
reden, which motion was based, in part, on
iier's subsequent Hague Convention petin filed in Sweden, district court should
ve considered importance of proper, uni•m interpretation of Hague Conventipn,
>ng .with Convention's purpose. Intemanal Child Abduction Remedies Act, § 4, 42
S.C.A. § 11603; Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule
[a)(2), 28 U.S.C JL

Gary L. Paxton (Rodney G. Snow with hini
on the briefs) of Clyde, Snow & SwensQn,
P.C., Salt Lake City, UT, for RespowtentrAppellee.
,
, ,.,.,>'

Parent and Child <^18
Treaties «=>13
Under contemplated procedures of
>gue Convention, district court, in ruling on
ther's Hague Convention petition for re-n of child to Sweden, should not have
isidered mother's removal of child from
ited States to Sweden in violation of court
ler, as father had not filed cross-petition
adjudicate propriety of mother's removal

Ms. Ohlander appeals the United States
District Court for the District of Utah's judgment denying her petition for the return of
her daughter Julia to Sweden under the
Hague Convention, ordering Julia's return to
Utah, denying her two motions to withdraw
and dismiss her petition, denying her motions to stay enforcement of the judgment,
and a subsequent judgment denying her Fed.
R.CivJ*. 60(b) motion to set aside the judg-

Daniel F. Bertch (Billie C. Nielsen, with
him on the brief), of Bertch & Birch, Salt
Lake City, UT, for Petitioner-Appellant.

,

itl

.

u

.1

Before BRORBY, BARRETT and., . .
MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Jydge.
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ment.1 Applying the standards under Fed.
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) in the Hague Convention
context, wp determine the district court
abused its discretion in denying the motion
to dismiss. We reverse and remand to the
district court with instructions to dismiss Ms.
Ohiander's petition.

I. BACKGROUND
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the
"Convention"), as implemented by both the
United States Congress through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1994), and Sweden,
was adopted by the signatory nations "to
protect children internationally from the
harmful effects of their wrongful removal or
retention and to establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of their
habitual residence." Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Dec. 23, 1981, Preamble, 51 Fed.
Reg. 10494, 10,498 (1986). The Convention is
meant to provide for a child's prompt return
once it has been established the child has
been 'Vrongfully removed" to or retained in
any affiliated state. Id., art. 1, 51 Fed.Reg.
at 10498.
Under the Convention, a removal or retention is "wrongful" if:
a. it is in breach of rights of custody
attributed to a person, an institution or
any other body, either jointly or alone,
under the law of the State in which the
child was habitually resident immediately
before the removal or retention; and
b. at the time of removal or retention
those rights were actually exercised, either
jointly or alone, or would have been so
exercised but for removal or retention.
IdL, art. 3, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10498. Once a
removal is deemed "wrongful." "the authority
concerned shall order the return of the
child." Id., art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499.
However, the Convention provides for several exceptions to return if the person opposing
return can show any of the following: 1) the
1.

Ms. Ohiander's appeal of the district court's
denial of her motion to set aside the judgment
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) was consolidated with
the direct appeal.

person requesting return was not, at the time
of the retention or removal, actually exercising custody rights or had consented to or
subsequently acquiesced in the removal or
retention, ?rf„. art. 13a. 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499,
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 2) the return of
the child would result in grave risk of physical or psychological harm to the child, idart. 13b, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A); 3) the
return of the child ,lwould not be permittedby the fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protection of human,
rights and fundamental freedoms," id., art,
20, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10500, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(A); or 4) the proceeding was1
commenced more than one year after the'
abduction and the child has become settled in
the new environment, id., art. 12, 51 Fed.'
Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B).
II. FACTS
Ms. Ohlander, a Swedish citizen, and Mr.
Larson, a United States citizen, were married in Utah in 1989. In August 1990. their
daughter Julia was born in Provo, Utah.
During the Christmas holiday season of
1990-91, when Julia was five months old, the
entire family traveled to Sweden to visit Ms.
Ohiander's family with the intent to return to>
their Utah home in January 1991. After
arriving in Sweden. Ms. Ohlander decided to
remain in Sweden with Julia; Ms. Ohlander
went into hiding with her daughter and sev-.
ered contact with her husband. Mr. Larson,
returned to Utah alone in mid-January 1991.
By April 1991, Mr. Larson had reestablished contact with Ms. Ohlander. In June
1991. with Julia now almost a year old, Ms.
Ohlander returned to Utah to be with Mr.!
Larson. Ms. Ohlander and Julia remained'
with Mr. Larson for seven months. On Jan*-'
uary 13, 1992, Ms. Ohlander returned with.
Julia to Sweden without Mr. Larson's consent.
By November 1993,2 Julia had resided conf |
tinuously in Sweden for almost two years, i
and was a little over three years old. Mr.}
2.

Between Januarv 1992 and November 1993)°
Ms. Ohlander and Mr. Larson were participating'
in divorce and custody proceedings taking placto
in Sweden.
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arson returned to Sweden with his new wife
) see Julia, and during one visitation, apiied the law of "grab and run" taking Julia
ack to Utah without Ms. Ohlander's con»nt. In January 1994, Ms. Ohiander filed a
2tition seeking her daughter's return pursuit to the Hague Convention in the United
tates District Court for the District of Utah.
is. Ohiander also secured an ex parte Order
•r Issuance of Warrant in Lieu of Writ of
abeas Corpus from the district court, dieting peace officers to take Julia into proactive custody and to release her to Ms.
hlander, but prohibiting Ms. Ohiander from
imoving Julia from Utah pending further
1er. Mr. Larson delivered Julia to Ms.
lander on January 30, 1994, and on Febru-y 1, 1994, Ms. Ohiander disobeyed the
)urt's order and applied her own version of
ie law of "grab and run" by returning to
kveden with Julia.
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Ms. Ohiander had 'Vrongfully removed" her
from Utah.5
The United States district court conducted
a hearing on Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss. During that hearing, the United
States district court was informed of Mr.
Larson's Hague Convention proceeding in
Sweden. The district court denied the motion to dismiss solely on the basis of Ms.
Ohlander's contempt of its order not to remove Julia from Utah. Ms. Ohiander later
orally renewed her motion to dismiss, which
the district court denied on the same
grounds.

The district court conducted a bench trial
on Ms. Ohlander's Hague Convention petition
to determine the issues of habitual residence
and wrongful removal pursuant to the Convention. However, neither Ms. Ohiander nor
Julia was present for the hearing, nor did
they testify by other means. Ms. Ohiander
In August 1994, shortly after Julia's fourth
presented no live witnesses and relied only
rthday, the district court entered an order
on the stipulated facts set out in the Pretrial
riding Ms. Ohiander in contempt and directOrder. Ultimately, the district court found
g her to return Julia to the United States
Julia was at all times a "habitual resident" of
ithin thirty days. Ms. Ohiander failed to
Utah, and as such, Ms. Ohlander's retention
imply. Two months later, in October 1994,
of Julia in Sweden in 1991, and her removals
Uowing Ms. Ohlander's and Julia's return
of Julia from Utah in 1992 and 1994 were all
Sweden, Mr. Larson filed a Convention
'"wrongful" under the Convention. Accord)plication for Julia's return with the United
ingly, the district court ordered Julia's imme;ates Central Authority, which was forwarddiate return to Utah and requested the aid of
1 to Sweden's Central Authority.3 Ms. Ohlthe Contracting States in achieving that goal.
lder then filed a motion, pursuant to Fed.
.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), to dismiss her district court
Following the United States district court's
itition, based, in part, on the Convention's decision, the Sweden courts held hearings to
t. 12, which authorizes a judicial authority determine the merits of Mr. Larson's petistay or dismiss the application or judicial tion. Both Mr. Larson and Ms. Ohiander
•oceedings seeking a child's return.4 were present during the Sweden court proague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at ceeding. The Sweden Supreme Administra1499. In January 1995, prior to the hearing tive Court held Julia's habitual residence
l Ms. Ohlander's motion, Mr. Larson peti- changed from Utah to Sweden after she had
>ned the Sweden court pursuant to the lived in Sweden for twelve months following
anvention for Julia's return on the ground the January 1992 abduction—a decision di42 U.S.C. § 11602 distinguishes between applications and petitions filed under the Convention.
A petition exists upon a person filing for relief in
court, while an application exists upon a person
filing with the United States' or any other country's Central Authority for a child's return. 42
U.S.C. § 1 ic02(l). (4)'
Specifically, the Convention's an. 12 slates:
Where the judicial or administrative authority
in the requested State has reason to believe

that the child has been taken to another state,
it may stay the proceedings, or dismiss the
application for the return of the child.
Hague Convention, art. 12. 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499.
5.

Presumably. Mr. Larson filed the petition in
addition lo the application to prevent Ms. Ohiander from asserting the **:>cltled environment" defense as it pertained to Ms. Ohlander's 1994
removal. This defense is discussed infra at p.
1540.
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rectly in conflict with the United States district court's holding.
Once the Sweden court had made its ruling, Ms. Ohlander filed a motion to stay
enforcement of the United States district
court's order, and a motion to set aside the
United States' judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(b). The United States district court denied the motions, again solely on the basis of
Ms. Ohlander's contempt. We are presented, therefore, with two international decisions standing in direct conflict, and it is this
contradiction we attempt to resolve for both
the present case and for future cases.
III. DISCUSSION
This case presents issues novel to this
court, and according to our research, novel to
this country. Our aim is to provide courts
with guidance in future similar cases, namely,
where two civil actions under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abductions are filed in disparate
courts due to a child's removal from the court
of first jurisdiction. Also, our aim is to give
meaning to the Convention's intended purpose of discouraging parents from fleeing
with their children in search of a favorable
decision. Notably, we are faced not only
with issues of the proper interpretation of
bare text in the form of the Hague Convention treaty, but also with the plight of a now
six-year-old girl to whom the law of "grab
and run" repeatedly has been applied.
We therefore must examine the following
competing interests of: the district court ensuring compliance with its orders; the procedural conduct of the parties; and most important, the Convention's intent and our duty
to see that intent justly carried out. Against
this backdrop, we attempt to untangle the
Gordian knot the parents, together, have
seen fit to tie.
IV. MOTION TO DISMISS
Even though Ms. Ohlander appeals several
of the district court's rulings, our decision on
the motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) is dispositive. Thus, we
need not address the remaining issues. We
therefore turn our focus to whether the district court abused its discretion in denying

Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2).
A.

Relevant Facts

Ms. Ohlander's first motion to dismiss was
filed shortly after Mr. Larson filed his Ha?ue
application for Julia's return to Utah with the
United States Central Authority. Ms. Ohlander's counsel raised her second motion to
dismiss orally during the bench trial. Relying on the Convention's art. 12, Ms. Ohlander
argued in her first motion to dismiss that
because Julia was no longer in the United
States and because Mr. Larson had initiated
his own Hague Convention application, the
United States district court should dismiss
the petition for Julia's return to Sweden. By
the time the United States district court
heard arguments regarding the first motion
to dismiss, Mr. Larson had initiated his own
petition in the Sweden courts regarding the
wrongfulness of Julia's removal from the
United States. The district court was aware
of the duplicative judicial action in Sweden.
Notwithstanding its knowledge of Mr. Larson's Hague Convention proceedings in Sweden, the district court summarily denied Ms.
Ohlander's motion solely on the basis of Ms.
Ohlander's contempt stating:
I'm not going to grant the Motion to
Dismiss and I'm not going to grant it
simply because this woman, the petitioner,
in my opinion, isn't in a position to ask me
to do that, because she's in violation of the
orders of this Court. She is simply in
violation. She invoked the jurisdiction.
She asked for our help, and then she,
contrary to the order of the Court, ran.
In her second motion to dismiss, Ms. Ohlander relied again on the Convention's art. 12,
the fact that Julia was no longer in the
United States, and the fact that Mr. Larson
had initiated judicial proceedings in Sweden.
The district court again denied Ms. Ohlander's second motion to dismiss due to her
contumacious conduct.
B.

Relevant Factors Considered Under
41(a)(2)IStandard of Review

[1-4] Once a defendant files an answer,,
as was the case here, a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action only upon order of
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court. Fed.R.Civ.P 41(a)(2). We review
district court's decision to deny a volunr
dismissal under such conditions for
se of discretion. American Nat'l Bank &
st Co. v. Bic Corp., 931 F.2d 1411, 1412
h Cir.1991). Absent "legal prejudice" to
defendant, the district court normally
dd grant such a dismissal. See Andes v.
unt Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir.
i) (voluntary dismissal "should not be deabsent substantial prejudice to the deant"); McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781
855, 856-57 (11th Cir.1986) ("in most
3 a dismissal shouid be granted unless
defendant will suffer clear legal preju'\ The parameters of what constitutes
prejudice" are not entirely clear, but
ant factors the district court should coninclude: the opposing party's effort and
ise in preparing for trial; excessive dend lack of diligence on the part of the
nt; insufficient explanation of the need
, dismissal; and the present stage of
tion. Phillips U.S.A, Inc. v. Allflez
L, Inc., 77 F.3d 354, 358 (10th Cir.1996).
factor need not be resolved in favor of
loving party for dismissal to be appros, nor need each factor be resolved in
of the opposing party for denial of the
n to be proper. Id. at 358.
\ above list of factors is by no means
iive. Id. at 358. Any other relevant
s should come into the district court's
on. In fact, in the context of this
j Convention proceeding, the district
was impressed with a duty to exercise
cretion by carefully appraising any add factors unique u> the context of this
ncluding the interests in comity, uniinterpretation of the Convention and
portance of giving import to the Hague
ition's intended purpose as relevant to
tion to dismiss.
] The district court should endeavor
ire substantial justice is accorded to
arties. 9 Charles Alan Wright and
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Pro§ 2364 at 278 (2d ed. 1994). A court,
re, must consider the equities not only
the defendant, but also those facing
intiff; a court's refusal to do so is a
of a full and complete exercise of
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judicial discretion. Id. at 297. In a complex,
emotional case such as this, it is critically
important when considering a motion to dismiss, the court give the equities of the plaintiff the attention deserved.
[7, 8] Finally, when considering a motion
to dismiss, a court must remember the important factors in determining legal prejudice
are those involving the parties, not the
court's time or effort spent on the case.
Clark v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th
Cir. 1993). A court abuses its discretion
when denying a motion to dismiss under
Ruie 41(a)(2) based on its inconvenience. Id.
at 1411.
[9-11] In sum, the district court was obligated to consider the novelty of the circumstances surrounding this case. Instead, the
court did not consider the merits of Ms.
Ohlander's motion due exclusively to her contumacious conduct. It is true Ms. Ohlander
blatantly violated the court's orders and absconded to Sweden with Julia in tow. We
refuse to condone such conduct. However,
neither can we condone a court ignoring its
duty to consider the merits of a motion to
dismiss simply because a party has violated
its orders. Whether a motion to dismiss
under Rule 41(a)(2) may be granted is a
matter initially left to the district court's
discretion, but such discretion does not excuse a court's failure to exercise any discretion, nor does it save an unpermitted exercise
of discretion from reversal. Alamance Indus., Inc. v. Fihme\ 291 F.2d 142, 146-17
(1st Cir.), cert denied, 368 U.S. 831, 82 S.Ct.
53, 7 L.Ed.2d 33 (1961). A clear example of
an abuse of discretion exists where the trial
court fails to consider the applicable legal
standard or the facts upon which the exercise
of its discretionary judgment is based. See
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cos. Co., 888
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (reviewing a
district court's 60(a) motion under an abuse
of discretion standard). We believe the district court's decision to deny Ms. Ohlander's
motion solely on the grounds of her contempt
and without considering any additional circumstances, amounts to a failure to exercise
discretion, and is, consequently, an abuse of
that discretion.
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C. Merits of Ms. Ohlander's 41(a)(2)
Motion

son argues he would be unfairly prejudiced
by Ms. Ohlander's excessive delay and lack of
diligence,
and by the lack of a sufficient
1. Traditional Factors
explanation in favor of dismissal. See All[121 Although the district court's failure
flex, 77 F.3d at 358. Mr. Larson argues Ms.
to apply the correct legal standard could
Ohlander's fiiing of her motion to dismiss
serve as a basis for remand, in the interest of
eleven months after the initiation of the proefficiency and judicial economy, and in the
ceedings and after Mr. Larson had requested
interest of providing immediate guidance as
a final pretrial hearing constitutes delay and
to the most appropriate direction of this case
lack of diligence. However, while Ms. Ohlanin light of the Convention's purpose, we turn
der moved to dismiss her petition eleven
to the merits of Ms. Ohlanders motion to
months after she initiated the proceeding,
dismiss. Clark 13 F.3d at 1411-13 (considour examination of the record illustrates Ms.
ering on appeal the merits of motion to disOhlander filed her motion to dismiss only
miss after district court abused its discreafter Mr. Larson had filed his application for
tion); Park County Resource Council v.
Julia's return with the United States Central
United States Dept of Agrii, 817 F.2d 609,
Authority. Therefore, the most persuasive
617-18 (10th Cir.1987) ("Although failure to
reason to file a motion to dismiss did not
apply correct legal standard could be basis
arise
until eleven months following the initial
for remand to the district court, we have
proceeding's
initiation. As a result, the timfound that remand is not necessary where
ing
of
Ms.
Ohlanders
motion could not conthere is no dispute regarding the underlying
stitute
excessive
delay
sufficient to legally
facts and where it is in the interest of judicial
prejudice
Mr.
Larson.
Moreover,
the record
economy and efficiency to decide the matshows
Ms.
Ohlander's
counsel
was
actively
ter."); see also McCord v. Bailey, 636 F2d
and
diligently
moving
forward
with
the
case
606, 613 (D.C.Cir.1980) (although inadequate
regardless
of
Ms.
Ohlander's
absence.
findings and conclusions may be remanded to
at and participated in
the district court for supplementation, appel- Counsel was present
6
every
hearing.
Therefore,
we conclude
late court will not remand for more specific
there
was
no
improper
delay
or
lack of dilifindings if doing so will consume judicial
gence
on
Ms.
Ohlander's
part
sufficient
to
resources without serving any purpose). We
believe, as is obvious from our remaining legally prejudice Mr. Larson.
analysis, no dispute regarding the underlying
[15] Further, we believe the reasons Ms.
facts exists and the existing record is adeOhlander has given for granting the motion
quate to address the issues of concern.
to dismiss are not insufficient such that they
[13,14] Mr. Larson argues that to grant prejudice Mr. Larson. In her motions to
Ms. Ohlander's motion would subject him to dismiss, Ms. Ohlander argued her petition
legal prejudice. More specifically, Mr. Lar- was moot and because Julia was no longer in
6. The dissent opines our statement here "is a
conclusory statement lacking support in the record" because between the time Ms. Ohlander
initiated the Convention proceeding and filed her
motion to dismiss. Ms. Ohlander "did virtually
nothing to affirmatively move her case along."
Unfortunately, this court has yet to explicitly
define "diligence" in the context of a Rule
41(a)(2) motion to dismiss. While the dissent
purports an "affirmative act" requirement, the
cases from this circuit touching on the issue
characterize diligence quite differently. Allflex,
77 F.3d at 358 (movants request for additional
time to respond to proffered facts and to conduct
further discovery constituted lack of diligence);
Clark. 13 F.3d at 1412 (movant's failure to exhaust state claims for purposes of habeas review
"cannot be construed as lack of diligence"); see

also. United States v. Outboard Marine Corp, 789
F.2d 497. 504 (7th Cir.1986) (lack of diligence,
may be shown by evidence of bad faith or unwarranted delay). We are not certain what "affirmative acts" the dissent would require, and to the
extent it would require a movant to file additional motions prior to a motion to dismiss, ail in the
name of "affirmative acts." we disagree. In fact,
affirmative acts to prolong litigation more typi-:
cally provide a basis for finding excessive delay;
and lack of diligence. See, e.g., Allflex. 77 F.3d at
358. The record before us shows counsel was
present at and fully participated in all hearings
and. outside the motions to dismiss, which were'
timely filed, did not cause undue delay. Consequently, there is adequate support in the record,
to reach our conclusion.
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ah, the Convention's art. 12 allowed for a tice requires us Co construe Mr. Larson's
y or dismissal of the proceedings. Ms. response to Ms. Ohlanders petition as a
lander also relied on the fact Mr. Larson counterclaim in this case. Mr. Larson chose
iself initiated a duplicative action in Swe- to assert his claims in a court of another
i as further support for the imposition of jurisdiction. Justice does not require us to
Convention's art. 12 dismissal provision, tortuously construe his response to Ms. Ohl-tainly, the first two reasons alone are ander's petition simply to retain jurisdiction
ifficient to support a motion to dismiss over this matter. Had Mr. Larson wanted
I could give parents an undue incentive to the United States courts to adjudicate his
i from Hague Convention proceedings, claim Ms. Ohlander wrongfully removed Julia
vever, as discussed at length below, we from Utah, he would have been far better
:e greater weight on Ms. Ohlander's prof- served by filing a cross-petition with the
id reasons that Mr. Larson initiated a district court rather than initiating an entire>nd action in Sweden and that the Con- ly new proceeding in Sweden. Consequently,
Lion's art. 12 lends support for dismissing we refuse to construe Mr. Larson's response
United States proceeding. Ms. Ohlan- as a counterclaim.7
reasons for requesting the motion to
liss are not insufficient such that they
2. Additional Relevant Factors
lly prejudice Mr. Larson. Rather, as
[17] As already noted, given the unique
Ohlander emphasizes, by initiating a jucircumstances
of this case, the district court
J proceeding in Sweden Mr. Larson himshould
have
considered
the importance of a
along with the Convention's terms, proproper,
uniform
interpretation
of the Coni the most persuasive reason to dismiss
vention,
along
with
a
consideration
of the
United States district court proceeding.
Convention's
purpose,
when
evaluating
the
Larson is hard pressed to argue he is
merits
of
Ms.
Ohlander's
motion
to
dismiss.
idiced by his own actions.
We now consider those factors.
I] Mr. Larson also argues the motion
smiss should not be granted because his
a. Proper Interpretation of the Hague
>nse to Ms. Ohlander's Hague ConvenConvention's Procedures
petition should be construed as a counum. It is true a court may construe a
When the district court considered whething mistakenly designated as a defense er Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from
counterclaim when justice requires. Utah was wrongful, it misconstrued the Conl.Civ.P. 8(c). However, because Mr. vention's contemplated procedures. Accord•n filed his own Hague Convention peti- ing to the Convention, once a petition is filed,
n Sweden, we remain unconvinced jus- a court should consider only whether a ree dissent claims that by relying on the fact
Larson initialed the second proceeding in
den we are somehow "punishing" Mr. Larfor enlisting the aid of the Sweden courts.
be contrary, we are only holding Mr. Larson
untable for his actions. Even though Julia
no longer within the United States when Mr.
an filed the petition in Sweden, the United
s court retained jurisdiction to determine
s state of habitual residence. See 42 U.S.C.
)03(b). The United States district court had
licuon over the original petition as the court
he place where the child is located at the
the petition is filed." Therefore, even
;h Julia was removed, the United States
retained jurisdiction to determine the
s place of habitual residence. Additionally,
srniissive language of the Convention's art.
smissal provision, which allows a court to
Dr dismiss an action versus mandating a

dismissal once a child is removed, suggests the
United States court retained jurisdiction even
after Julia was removed from Utah.
Rather than relying on the original action, Mr.
Larson initiated a second proceeding, which has
resulted in a ruling contrary to his interests and
which has resulted in two conflicting international decisions, a problem we must somehow address. Certainly, we are not punishing him by
subjecting him to the results of the proceeding
he, in fact, initiated. Further, the fact Mr. Larson attempted to limit the Sweden court's jurisdiction is of no moment. Once Mr. Larson filed
the petition in the Sweden court, that court had
proper jurisdiction to determine Julia's place of
habitual residence regardless of the fact Mr. Larson attempted to limit the Sweden court's review
to the 1994 removal. Hague Convention, art. 3,
51 Fed.Reg. at 10498.
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spondevt's removals of a child are wrongful.
Sec Hague Convention, arts. 3, 12, 51 Fed.
Reg. at KM98. 10499, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b).
(eh Here, antithetic to the Convention's intent as a whole, the court considered whether
the petitwnrr's removals of the child were
wrongful.
[18] When Ms. Ohlander petitioned the
United States district court for Julia's return
to Sweden, the issue before the court was
whether Mr. Larson's removal of Julia from
Sweden was wrongful pursuant to the Convention. Hague Convention, art. 3, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10498. Once Ms. Ohlander removed
Julia from Utah, the issue became whether
Ms. Ohlander's removals were wrongful. Id.
By filing his own petition in the Sweden
courts, Mr. Larson chose to adjudicate Ms.
Ohlander's removals of Julia in the foreign
court rather than in the United States district court. The district court's consideration
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia without
Mr. Larson having filed a cross-petition in
that court was contrary to the Convention's
intended procedures.

10499, 42 U.S.C. * 11603(e)(2)(B). Consequently, Ms. Ohlander could not, under the
Convention's contemplated procedures, properly assert the "settled environment" defense. However, once Mr. Larson filed his
own petition in Sweden seeking to adjudicate
Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia from Utah.
Ms. Ohlander rightfully could assert the "sectied environment" defense. Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Conversely, had Mr. Larson filed a cross-petition in the United States
district court for Julia's return to Utah, rather than instigating an entirely new action in
Sweden, Ms. Ohlander properly could have
asserted her defenses in the United States
district court. Since Mr. Larson chose to
initiate a second Convention proceeding in
Sweden, Sweden was the jurisdiction where
the claims and defenses of both Ms. Ohlander
and Mr. Larson could be more fairly adjudicated. Therefore, the proper interpretation
of the Convention weighs in favor of dismissing the United States action and allowing the
issues to be decided in Sweden.8

Additionally, denial of Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss renders Ms. Ohlander's most
relevant defense to Julia's return to Utah
unavailable, namely, the "settled environment" defense. Hague Convention, art. 12,
51 Fed.Reg. at
10499, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). Under the Convention's
plain terms, one defense to a child's return is
showing the petition was filed a year after
the child's removal or retention and that the
child has become settled in his or her new
environment Hague Convention, art. 12, 51
Fed.Reg.
at
10499,
42
U.S.C.
§ 11603(e)(2)(B). When Ms. Ohlander filed
her petition, she was asking for Julia's return
to Sweden; any defenses to Julia's return,
under Article 12 or otherwise, were available
only to the respondent, Mr. Larson. See
Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at

This result is further supported by the
plain language of the Convention's art. 12,
which states "where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has
reason to believe the child has been taken to
another State, it may stay the proceedings or
dismiss the application for the return of the
child/' Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.
Reg. at 10499. While this language is permissive rather than mandatory, its words
merit a court's consideration when denying a
motion to dismiss. Congress has declared
the importance of "the need for uniform international interpretation of the Convention."
42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B). Article 12 helps
to ensure two disparate courts will not reach
conflicting decisions by encouraging courts to
dismiss or stay their actions where appropriate. This case poses a perfect example of
the need for Article 12's dismissal provision:

8. The dissent takes issue with our interpretation
of the availability of this defense to Ms. Ohlander. Apparently, the dissent interprets the Convention as restricting the Sweden courts review
to Ms. Ohlanders 1994 removal of Julia and not
to allow review of Ms. Ohlander's additional
retentions and removals of Julia, particularly Ms.
Ohlanders 1992 removal of Julia from Utah. We
disagree with this interpretation. The Conven-

tion ts intended to provide finality to the parties,
and it is our duty to see this intent carried out
We note this is an extremely difficult case, dealing with the Convention's interpretation, an area
singularly lacking in helpful precedent or congressional guidance. It is merely our duty to
resolve this case as best we can in accordance
with our interpretation of the Convention and to
give import to the intentions of that Convention.
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United States district court had knowl;e that Julia had been taken to Sweden,
I that a second action initiated by Mr.
•son was pending in Sweden, where all the
ties, including the child, were present,
irefore, we conclude the adherence to inied Hague Convention procedures supt Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss.
b. Intent of the Hague Convention
ailing to grant the motion to dismiss
re a second duplicative action has been
I in a different country would potentially
ier the Hague Convention meaningless.
I of the Convention's intent is "to ensure
rights of custody and of access under
aw of one Contracting State are effecy respected in other Contracting States."
ue Convention, art. 1(b), 51 Fed.Reg. at
>8. Prior to the Convention, when faced
an unfavorable custody decision, a parvould flee to another country in search of
stody decision in his or her favor. This
d often result in rwo conflicting custody
>ions without guidance as to which councustody decision had preference. The
je Convention was drafted with the into remove forever the incentive for a
nt to flee across borders to obtain a
able ruling. Letter of Transmittal from
dent Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985),
nted in 51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10,495
I); Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. 10494,
> (1986). Under the Convention, a child
be expediently returned to his or her
of habitual residence "so that a court
can examine the merits of the custody
te and award custody in the child's best
ists" Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed.Reg. at
i. As a result, the Convention was
t, in part, to lend priority to the custody
mination hailing from the child's state
)itual residence.
He the Convention proceedings in this
certainly have not achieved this intendjult, a refusal to dismiss this action only
rbates the problem. By failing to dishe United States action we would allow
nd two conflicting decisions regarding
* dissent opines our reliance on this factor is
c because the conflict between the two deciwas merely "potential" at the time Mr.
3n Bled the duplicative action in Sweden. It
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Julia's state of habitual residence, which
could very well require a Hague Convention
to determine which Hague Convention determination is valid. This, of course, is absurd.
By dismissing this action, we instead require
these and future litigants to choose which
jurisdiction will determine a child's state of
habitual residence, thereby salvaging what
we can of the Convention's intended purpose.9
•'
Failing to grant the motion to dismiss also
could create a new incentive for parents to
flee Hague Convention proceedings in the
hope of obtaining a second, more favorable
Convention determination in another country. We then would be left to solve the
riddle of which competing ruling in each case
is valid. This is a task we refuse to acquire.
Rather, we believe the parties' interests
would be best represented and judicial resources best spent if parents engaged in this
type international custody battle are required to resolve their dispute in one jurisdiction or the other. Holding Mr. Larson
and future litigants to one jurisdiction gives
import to the Convention's intended meaning.
c

Ms. Ohlander's Contempt

[19-211 Certainly, the court's interest in
ensuring a party's compliance with its orders
is a great one, enforceable by fines or imprisonment. Spallone v. United States, 493 US.
265, 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, 632-33, 107 L.Ed^d
644 (1990). However, a court is obliged to
use the "'least possible power adequate to
the end proposed.1" Id at 276, 110 S.Ct at
632 (quoting United States v. Yankers, 856
F.2d 444, 454 (2d Cir.1988), and Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)).
Here, certainly other measures were available to compel compliance, such as personal
sanctions against the mother, or possibly
staying a decision pending the child's return.
Under the provisions of the International
Child Abduction Remedies Act, the district
court has the authority to implement meats precisely the "potentiai" conflict between different countries' custody decisions that made the
Convenuon necessary.
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sures to "prevent the child's further removal
or concealment before the final disposition of
the petition." 42 U.S.C. § 11604. Given Ms.
Ohlander's history of removing Julia from
the United States, to prevent Ms. Ohlander
from repeating this behavior, perhaps the
district court should have imposed more rigid
measures, such as requiring Ms. Ohlander to
surrender both her and Julia's passports to
the clerk of court prior to receiving physical
custody of Julia, or leaving custody with Mr.
Larson pending the petition's outcome. See
Currier v. Currier, 845 F.Supp. 916, 923
(D.N.H.1994) (district court requiring petitioner surrender her and her children's passport to the court's clerk pending appeal).
However, if such measures are not imposed,
or if they fail, the court is not thereby released of its duty to consider the merits of
the parties' cases when considering how best
to enforce compliance. In sum, there is no
doubt Ms. Ohlander's actions were contemptible, for she brazenly thumbed her nose at
the United States district court's order not to
remove Julia from Utah; nevertheless, such
conduct does not warrant a court denying a
motion to dismiss solely on that ground.
In sum, we hold it necessary to dismiss
this action. Mr. Larson does not suffer legal
prejudice from such a dismissal, and the
balance of relevant factors, along with the
intent of the Convention, weigh in favor of
dismissal.
, We REVERSE the district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice.

record in light of the new law established bj] '<
this court's opinion. Therefore, I dissenfc 1
from the majority's resolution of the motiotf'"
to dismiss on the merits and its failure'tofremand.
"^nt\~
A

Rule U(a)(2) Factors

• ^

The trial court denied Ms. Ohlander's Fed. *~
R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss for the )
sole reason that Ms. Ohlander was in cotK^
tempt of court. In doing so, the court fe2ai^
to consider the appropriate legal standarajj
under Rule 41(a)(2). Although the trial cour^
could properly consider Ms. Ohlander's coijg'
temptuous conduct, it was also required tjrj
evaluate other governing legal criteria
McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cos. Co.,-. 889
F.2d 678, 680 (10th Cir.1989) (noting trig,
court errs when it fails to consider applicable
legal standard or facts on which exercise tJftj
discretionary judgment is based). Its faihwj
to do so requires reversal.
^ttaf^
Ironically, the majority has reversed .thtfj
district court for refusing to grant Ms. QptfM
ander's motion for the sole reason that %^J
was in contempt of court, yet ruled de
that Ms. Ohlander's motion should be w
ed for the sole reason that Mr. Larson
ated his own Hague Convention proce&fJS
ings.1 The district court was required
evaluate fairly all Rule 41 factors; we shi
similarly be bound. An adequate recorcf\
remand, however, would be necessary.

I concur in the majority's conclusion that
the district court erred in failing to consider
the governing legal standards and relevant
facts relating to Ms. Ohlander's Fed.R.Civ.P.
41 motion to dismiss. Rather than resolve
the Rule 41 issue ourselves, however, we
should remand this case to the district court
for an appropriate Rule 41 evaluation and an
accompanying adequate development of the

In evaluating a Rule 41(a)(2) motion jt9
dismiss, a court must consider the preju
to the non-moving party. Clark v. Tansffl.
F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir.1993). In m '
we adopted the following factors to'
"legal prejudice" to the opposing partyi^l
the non-moving party's effort and expen
preparation for trial; (2) the moving pa
delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting I
action; and (3) insufficient explanation1^
the need to allow a dismissal. Clark, 131

1. As discussed on pages 1534-35. the only other
factor the majority articulates in favor of Ms.
Ohlander's motion is its conclusory statement,
lacking support in the record, that there was no
excessive delay and lack of diligence on Ms.

t d
Ohlander's part in bringing her moi
Stripped of this unsupported assertion, it iCci
dent that the majority's outcome rests on
the desire to avoid a potentially conflicting'*
sion from another sovereign state.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

;
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excessive delay sufficient to legally prejudice
Mr. Larson." Maj Op. at 1538. The logic of
this statement is unclear. The filing of her
motion in no way reflects her pre-filing diligence m prosecuting her case once she removed the child from the United States in
violation of the district court's order. Indeed, Mr. Larson's application with the United States Central Authority is absolutely irThe record does not address Mr. Larson's
relevant to an evaluation of whether Ms.
ffort and expense of preparation for trial.
Ohlander diligently pursued her separately
Is. Ohlander did not file her motion to dis- filed action before the United States District
liss, however, until Mr. Larson had filed a Court.
squest for a final pretrial conference, sugFinally, Ms. Ohlander did not provide a
esting that Mr. Larson had completed sub- sufficient explanauon of her need for dismiss-antial trial preparation. If so, this would al. Ms. Ohlander gave three reasons for her
lgh against granting a motion to dismiss. Rule 41 motion, all derived from her fleeing
with the child in violation of the district
As to the second Tansy factor, the majori- court order and her defiance of the district
r states that "the record shows Ms. Ohlan- court a subsequent order that the child be
2r's counsel was actively and diligently mov- returned to Utah. None of Ms. Ohlander's
ig forward with the case regardless of Ms. reasons warrant dismissal of her action. The
hlander's absence." Maj. Op. at 1538. A majority forthngntly acknowledges that
jview of the docket sheet, the only record of granting Ms. Ohlander's motion based on her
LS. Ohlander's litigation activity, undermines first two reasons (that her petition was moot,
LIS assertion. The docket reveals that Ms. and the child was no longer in the state of
hlander waited almost a year after initiat- Utah) would create a perverse incentive for
others to use United States courts to obtain
g her action before filing her motion to
physical control of their children and then
smiss. During this time she did virtually unlawfully flee the United States. Thus,
>thing to affirmatively move her case along; these reasons concededly provide no support
stead, she merely responded through coun- for Ms. Ohlander's motion.
1 to Mr. Larson's efforts to ootain a conThe majority concludes that Ms. Ohlanmpt order and the return of Julia to Utah. der's third reason for dismissal, Mr. Larson's
IUS, if anything, the limited record before application to the Swedish Authority and his
supports the conclusion that Ms. Ohlander subsequent petition to the Swedish court,
d not diligently prosecute this action. In- "provided the most persuasive reason to dised, her conduct in absconding with Julia in miss the United States district court pro)lanon of the court order belies a motiva- ceeding." Maj. Op. at 1539. Punishing Mr.
>n to move her case forward. A remand Larson for enlisting the aid of the only sover>uld be useful on this point to explore eignty with physical control of his child, however, ignores the practical and emotional dilether she or her counsel made any efforts
lemma with which Mr. Larson was faced.
prosecute the case that do not now appear Litigating this matter in the United States
the record.
could not provide Mr. Larson what he sought
most: contact with his child. With his child
The majority also opmes that because Ms. in Sweden, albeit unlawfully, Mr. Larson had
llander filed her motion to dismiss after no real alternative but to seek Swedish assisr. Larson filed his application with the tance.2 Otherwise, he wab faced with the
uted States Central Authority, "the timing devastating potential of a lingering loss of
Ms. Ohlander's motion could not constitute contact with his daughter. In addition, Mr.

t 1411. This list is not exhaustive; a court
lay also consider other relevant factors in
* Rule 41(a)(2) analysis. Phillips USA
nc. v. All/lex USA Inc., 77 F 3d 354, 358
LOth Cir.1996) (noting above factors are not
xclusive, but instead are guides for district
Durt).

As noted on page* 1535-36. hu» filing in Sweien was also mandated by ihe United States
enabling legislation for the Hague Convention.

the International Child Abduction Remedies Act.
which provides jurisdiction only to courts "in the
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Larson had strategic litigation reasons for
filing in Sweden when he did. The Hague
Convention allows a parent who has fled even
unlawfully with a child to assert a settled
environment defense to a petition for return
of a child if the petition is not filed within one
year from the date the child is taken. Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Dec. 23, 1981, art. 12,
51 Fed.Reg. 10494, 10499 (1986). Mr. Larson, therefore, had only one year to file if he
wanted to prevent Ms. Ohlander from creating this defense by her unlawful flight. Under these circumstances, Mr. Larson's filing
in Sweden does not in any way compel the
dismissal of the United States action.
B. Additional Factors
1. Appropriate Forum
The majority maintains that Sweden was
"the jurisdiction where the claims and defenses of both Ms. Ohlander and Mr. Larson
could be more fairly adjudicated." Maj. Op.
at 1540. Specifically, the majority bases its
preference for a Swedish adjudication on the
presence of all the parties, including Julia, in
Sweden, and its view that only in Sweden
could Ms. Ohlander assert a "settled environment" defense.
Placing weight on the presence of all parties in the Swedish proceedings is inappropriate. The precipitating reason for all parties'
participation in the Swedish action was Ms.
Ohlander's unlawful flight from the United
States with Julia. Had Ms. Ohlander obeyed
the district court's order and remained in
Utah with Julia during the pendency of the
United States proceedings, all parties would
have been physically present for the United
States proceedings. Instead, Ms. Ohlander
chose to participate through counsel rather
than to personally attend the United States
trial. Her unlawful absence from the United
States trial should not accrue to her benefit
The majority's view that the settled environment defense is available only in Sweden
is similarly flawed. Article 12 of the Hague
Convention creates the settled environment
place where the child is located at the time the

defense only when "a period of less than one
year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention." Hague Convention, art. 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10499. Because
Mr. Larson filed in Sweden within one year
of Ms. Ohlander's removal of Julia, the defense was unavailable to Ms. Ohlander in the
Swedish action. Similarly, if Mr. Larson had
complied with the majority's ruling and filed
in the United States within one year of Julia's removal, the defense would have been
unavailable in the United States action.
Furthermore, the majority erroneously asserts that denying Ms. Ohlander's motion to
dismiss renders the settled environment defense unavailable to her in the Utah action.
The availability of the settled environment
defense hinges on the filing and timing of
Mr. Larson's own petition, not on whether
Ms. Ohlander's motion to dismiss is granted
or denied.
2. Hague Convention Procedures
The majority also states that Mr. Larson
"chose to assert his claims in a court of
another jurisdiction," Maj. Op. at 1539 (emphasis added), and that he would have been
better served by filing a cross-petition in the
United States District Court. Mr. Larson
did not, however, have a choice where to file
his petition once Ms. Ohlander took Julia to
Sweden. Section 11603(b) of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, the
enabling legislation for the Hague Convention, provides:
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access to a child may do so
by commencing a civil action by filing a
petition for the relief sought in any court
which has jurisdiction of such action and
which is authorized to exercise its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located
at the time the petition is filed
42 U.S.C. § 11603(b) (emphasis added). At
the time Mr. Larson filed his petition in
January 1995, Julia was in Sweden, not Utah.
At that point in time, the enabling legislation
petition is filed." 42 U.S.C § 11603(b).
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for the Hague Convention itself compelled
Mr. Larson to file in Sweden because of
Julia's presence there; it was the only nation
with jurisdiction.
Mr. Larson was careful to limit his Swedish petition to the issue of Ms. Ohlander's
taking of Julia in February 1994. The petition specifically informed the Swedish court
)f the Hague Convention proceedings pendng in the United States District Court for
he District of Utah, and that Mr. Larson
vas not intending to confer jurisdiction on
he Swedish courts over the Hague Convenion matters that were properly before the
Jnited States District Court. Mr. Larson
Jso requested that the Swedish courts await
le district court's ruling on those matters.
After the United States District Court enBred its findings and conclusions, the United
tates Central Authority notified Sweden of
le United States ruling and asked that the
wedish court limit its decision to the issue
resented in Mr. Larson's petition. In a
lemo to Sweden's Central Authority, a repssentative of the Office of Children's Issues
ated:
The only unresolved Hague Convention issue for the Swedish courts to rule upon is
the final resolution of Ms. Ohlander's most
recent removal of the child from Utah on
February 1, 1994. There is no doubt that
Sweden is the '^requested State" for the
adjudication of that issue, and that the
Swedish courts have exclusive jurisdiction
to make a final resolution of that matter in
accordance with the provisions of the
Hague Convention. Regarding that removal, the U.S. Court, as a judicial authority of the "requesting State," has made
findings in accordance with Article 15 of
the Convention, namely that the removal
jvas in breach of Mr. Larson's actuallyixercised rights of custody under Utah
aw, and that Mr. Larson neither consentBefore the Sweden Supreme Administrative
oun created the international conflict in decions. the United States Central Authority eneated the Swedish courts:
It is only through [ ] cooperation that the
Hague Convention can successfully resolve
these international conflicts over children, as it
was designed to do. The present case offers a
perfect illustration: A Hague Convention judgment from Sweden which respects the prior

ed to nor acquiesced in the removal.
These findings, coupled with the judicially
established fact that the child was habitually resident in Utah in November 1993,
where she continued to live until the date
of said removal, clearly establish that this
was a new wrongful removal within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention.
Memorandum from Mr. James L. Schuler,
Office of Children's Issues, United States
Central Authority, to Central Authority of
Sweden 2 (August 14,1995).
The Hague Convention procedures thus
not only required Mr. Larson to file in Sweden, where the child was located, but also
allowed him to limit his petition to the one
issue not before the United States District
Court By following Hague Convention procedures and limiting his Swedish petition, he
did not voluntarily create the potential for
conflicting international decisions.
3. Conflicting Decisions
The majority's desire to avoid conflicting
decisions of sovereign states is a worthy goal.
Nevertheless, no law, national or international can be expected to resolve such conflicts
in all cases, particularly cases involving a
mother and father warring over their offspring. To base the outcome of this case on
a potentially conflicting decision of Sweden is
to unjustifiably abandon the rights of a United States citizen in the name of international
comity. It is indeed ironic to do so when the
substantive decision of the district court was
not in conflict with any extant Swedish decision at the time of its promulgation. To the
contrary, the Swedish decision favorable to
Ms. Ohlander created the conflict in the decisions of two sovereign nations. The Swedish
decision was issued after and in conflict with
the district court decision.3 See United
States ex rel Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165,
169-70 (3d Cir.1997) ("As a condition to honoring a foreign country's judicial decrees, the
Hague Convention judgment from the U.S. will
put an end to the international jurisdictional
competition between these States and will allow for a final and long-overdue custody adjudication, thus providing for the best interests
of the child and finally allowing her to develop
stable, secure family relationships, On the
other hand, a Hague Convention judgment
from Sweden which disregards the prior
Hague Convention judgment from the United
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Court also requires reciprocity on the part of
the foreign nation."); Remington Rand
Corp.-DeL v. Business Sys. Inc., 830 F.2d
1260, 1273 (3d Cir.1987) (noting comity must
be "two-way street" and reciprocity is consideration of "extreme importance").
Because no Hague Convention decisions
had been rendered by any Swedish courts at
the time the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss, it is furthermore inappropriate for this court to base its ruling on the
conflict in decisions. See Maj. Op. at 1541
("By failing to dismiss, the United States
action we would allow to stand two conflicting decisions regarding Julia's state of habitual residence
"). Instead, our review
should be limited to those factors before the
district court at the time it ruled. New
factual matters should only be considered by
the district court in the exercise of its discretion on remand.
U. Consideration of Ms. Ohiander's Contempt
The district court's consideration of Ms.
Ohiander's contempt of court was entirely
appropriate. Although the district court considered this to the exclusion of other relevant
criteria, its actions in doing so are understandable, if not correct. Ms. Ohlander
availed herself of the services of the district
court to obtain temporary custody of the
child.' She then fled this country in direct
States would only perpetuate and escalate the
already intolerable conflict, as the parties
would then possess contradictory Hague Convention judgments in their favor from their
respective States, which would be the most
unstable and insecure situation imaginable.
Such a situation would guarantee that whichever parent has possession of the child would
not dare allow the other parent access to the
child, and the parent without possession of the
child would have no option but to resort to
force in order to have anv contact with the
child.
Memo from Mr. James L. Schuler, Office of
Children's Issues, to Central Authority of Sweden
2-3 (August 14. 1995).
k Rule 41(a)(2) provides: "If a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon the defendant of the plaintiffs motion to
dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim
can remain pending for independent adjudication bv the court-" Fed.RXiv.P. 41(a)(2).

violation of the very order by which she
obtained physical control of the child. Her
conduct can neither be ignored nor rewarded. Although this should not control the
district court's decision to the exclusion ->f
other governing factors, it may fairly be given significant weight in the court's overall
analysis.
C. Treatment of Larson's Defenses is
Counterclaims
The majority rejects Mr. Larson's request
that his response to Ms. Ohiander's petition
be treated as a counterclaim or, for Hague
Convention purposes, a petition.4 Maj. Op.
at 1538-39. Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure allows a court to treat a
defense as a counterclaim, "if justice so requires." In Mr. Larson's response to Ms
Ohiander's petition, he alleges that the United States was, and at all times had been, the
country of Julia's habitual residence as defined under the Hague Convention, and
prays for his daughter's return to his physical care and control. The essence of Mr.
Larson's response is generally equivalent to
the relief he would request were he to fUe his
own formal Hague Convention petition.5
Treating Mr. Larson's response as a counterclaim would place the.respondent's removal
of the child and any proper settled environment defense before the district court, thus
eradicating the majority's concern that such
issues could not be decided without Mr. Lar5. For example. Ms. Ohiander's petition before
the district court requested the following relief:
Petitioner requests that the child be immediately returned to her custody, and that she be
permitted to return to Sweden, which is the
country of habitual residence of both Petitioner
and the child, and that temporarily, pending
further hearing on this Petition, she be permitted to retain custody of the child within the
jurisdiction of this Court pending this Court's
final determination.
Petition for Return of Child to Petitioner at 4;
Mr. Larson alleged substantially the same matters in his defenses. Justice would not be served
by requiring Mr. Larson to file a separate pleading, formally designated as a counterclaim, alleging the very matters already contained in his
defenses. To do so honors form over substance
in an emotionally charged setting where a parent
seeks to reestablish contact with his child.
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has set forth a set of novel factors it believes
must be evaluated in this case. The trial
court had absolutely no notice that consideration of such factors would be required in
this case. If the majority is going to require
a trial court to consider novel factors, that
court should be given an opportunity to exercise its discretion, address those factors on
remand and develop a meaningful record.
At that time, the district court could carefully
consider the mandate of the Convention's
). Conclusion
Article 12 which provides that a forum may
'he majority has reversed the district
stay or dismiss a Hague Convention prort for refusing to dismiss Ms. Ohlander's ceeding when the subject child has been taktion on the basis of her contempt of court en to another State. Hague Convention, art.
instead has ruled de novo that Ms. Ohl- 12, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,499.
er's motion should have been granted,
In the context of this case, an appellate
doing so, the majority has considered
ruling
as a matter of law is inappropriate. I
3 not before the district court at the time
would reverse and remand for further proiled. It has further allowed those very
ceedings on Ms. Ohlander's Rule 41 motion
» (ie.> conflicting international decisions)
to dismiss.
mtrol the outcome of this appeal, to the
ision of other governing criteria.
( O | tV( NUMBER SYSTEK
ds case should be remanded to the discourt for full consideration of Rule
(2) criteria.6 The trial court failed to
der critical factors governing Ms. Ohlan- EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY, Eastman
motion. Consequently, the record of
Chemical Company, and Zimmer Akfactors is incomplete. An appellate
tiengesellschaft, Plaintiffs/Cross-Appelmay decide a matter rather than relants,
if the underlying facts are undisputed
v.
idicial economy and efficiency would be
The
GOODYEAR
TIRE & RUBBER
ired thereby. Park County Resource
COMPANY,
Defendantril Inc. v. United States Dept ofAgric,
Appellant
'.2d 609, 617-18 (10th Cir.1987), averand
on other grounds by Village of Los
IOS de Albuquerque v. Marsh, 956 F.2d Shell Oil Company, Defendant-Appellant.
>73 (10th Cir.1992). Such is not the
Nos. 95-1511, 95-1512, 95ere. A remand is required when the
1532 and 95-1533.
needs further development. See
United States Court of Appeals,
/ v. McCormick 40 F.3d 337, 341 (10th
Federal Circuit
M) (remanding when record inadeMay 20, 1997.
to evaluate trial court's consideration
ired criteria).
As Modified on Limited Grant of
Rehearing July 2, 1997.
lis case, the record is simply insufH> enable this court to apply adequately
al criteria governing Rule 41(a)(2) moOwner of exclusive right to enforce pat) dismiss. In addition, the majority ent for process for making granules of con-

n's own petition in the district court. See
ague Convention, arts. 3 & 12, 51 Fed.Reg.
10,498-10,499; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), (e).
light of Rule 41(a)(2) factors and the
igue Convention's objective of protecting
Idren from the law of "grab and run,"
aj. Op. at 1534-35), the interests of justice
j indeed served by construing Mr. Lari's response as a counterclaim.

£

incongruous for this court to say that Rule
Lions are addressed to the sound discretion
tnal court and yet. rather than remand,
novo that trial court discretion as a mataw could only result in dismissal. Beyond
:ongruity. ruling de novo that Ms. Ohlanlule 41 motion should be granted as a

matter of law assumes that the district court's
discretionary ruling upon remand would be denial of the motion, rather than granting the motion
or even staying the action, an alternative expressly contemplated by the Hague Convention.
Hague Convention, art. 12. 51 Fed.Reg. at 10,499.
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